I investigate whether corporate accountability reporting helps protect firm value. Specifically, I examine (1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (e.g., bribery, kickbacks, discrimination), and (2) whether prior corporate accountability reporting reduces the negative stock price reaction when high-profile misconduct does occur. Using multiple methods to address self-selection, I find that, on average, firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms to manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which, in turn, influences expected punishments.

Evidence suggests a large proportion of profitable U.S. firms have low effective tax rates (i.e., an ETR between 0 and 10%). Despite widespread interest in how firms avoid paying taxes, we do not know how most firms attain low ETRs and whether they are primarily benefiting from benign or aggressive tax positions. Using a research design that explicitly examines low ETR firms, we predict and find that the majority are primarily benefiting from a benign tax position: large net operating loss carryforwards (NOLs). We also find that large NOLs allow firms to persistently retain low ETRs year after year. In contrast, we find that multinationals and tax haven firms, which should have more opportunities for aggressive tax planning, have a lower probability of attaining a low ETR (relative to domestic and non-tax haven firms). Collectively, these findings suggest that the typical low ETR firm does not incur significant tax risk. Consistent with this, we find that low ETR firms accrue unrecognized tax benefits at a similar rate as firms that pay the statutory tax rate and do not experience higher future tax rate volatility. Overall, the results shed light on the profile of the average low ETR firm and provide evidence that the majority are utilizing large NOLs rather than aggressive tax planning.

We investigate whether attitudes toward gambling help explain the occurrence of intentional misreporting. Similar to gambling, some financial reporting choices involve taking deliberate, speculative risks. We predict that in places where gambling is more socially acceptable, managers will be more likely to take financial reporting risks that increase the likelihood the financial statements will need to be restated. To test this prediction, we exploit geographic variation in local gambling attitudes and find that restatements due to intentional misreporting are more common in areas where gambling is more socially acceptable. This association is even stronger in situations where management is under greater pressure to misreport, including when the firm is close to meeting a performance benchmark, experiencing poor financial performance, or under investment‐related pressure. Furthermore, these results are robust to numerous tests to address omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these findings suggest gambling attitudes help explain the incidence of intentional misreporting.

Financial statement fraud generates many negative effects, including reducing people's willingness to participate in the stock market. If it also stigmatizes accounting, it may similarly adversely affect the quantity and quality of workers willing to become accountants, thereby potentially creating negative effects for years to come. We examine the impact of fraud on the labor force entering the accounting profession, which is a key input into the production of accounting information (i.e., the output). Using data describing millions of college students across the United States, we find incoming students are actually more likely to major in accounting when local frauds occur during their formative years. These students are also more likely to have attributes desired by the accounting profession (e.g., high academic aptitude) and are more likely to subsequently serve in public accounting and become Certified Public Accountants. In the context of other fields (i.e., all college majors), we find that fraud similarly spurs interest in other business disciplines, but not in majors outside of business schools. Those attracted to other business disciplines, however, generally possess different traits. Specifically, students entering accounting are distinctively more likely to exhibit values espoused by the accounting profession, including a predisposition to public service and less commercial orientation. Thus, nonpecuniary motives appear to uniquely drive accounting student enrollment following fraud. Collectively, our findings suggest that, while fraud is unmistakably bad, it appears to have the positive unintended consequence of attracting labor into business disciplines and, in accounting, increasing the prevalence of desirable traits among entrants.

Despite the rising use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, there is substantial disagreement across rating agencies regarding what rating to give to individual firms. As what drives this disagreement is unclear, we examine whether a firm's ESG disclosure helps explain some of this disagreement. We predict and find that greater ESG disclosure actually leads to greater ESG rating disagreement. These findings hold using firm fixed effects and using a difference-in-differences design with mandatory ESG disclosure shocks. We also find that raters disagree more about ESG outcome metrics than input metrics (policies), and that disclosure appears to amplify disagreement more for outcomes. Last, we examine consequences of ESG disagreement and find that greater ESG disagreement is associated with higher return volatility, larger absolute price movements, and a lower likelihood of issuing external financing. Overall, our findings highlight that ESG disclosure generally exacerbates ESG rating disagreement rather than resolves it. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

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Because internal control audits never existed before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and these audits simultaneously became mandatory for all U.S. accelerated filer companies, it has been difficult to assess the extent of investor demand for these audits. To understand whether investors demand internal control audits for these large companies, we exploit a regulatory exemption that permits companies to exclude acquired operations from an internal control audit. Using this voluntary setting, we find that investors react negatively if a company excludes acquired operations from their internal control audit. This negative reaction is larger when more of the company's operations are excluded from audit and when there is greater information uncertainty. Further, companies that exclude acquired operations from internal control audits are more likely to have a subsequent restatement. Collectively, these findings are consistent with investors perceiving value in (i.e., demanding) internal control audits for large U.S. public companies.

In this study, we examine whether sell-side security analysts gain access to value-relevant information through political connections. We measure analysts' political connections based on political contributions at the brokerage-house level. We argue that if brokerages are able to obtain private information through their political connections, then analysts at politically connected brokerages should issue more profitable stock recommendations, and this increased profitability should be more pronounced for politically sensitive stocks. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions. Analyses of recommendations issued surrounding the Affordable Care Act further support our main inferences. Moreover, our findings hold after we employ numerous tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these results suggest that brokerages obtain value-relevant, nonpublic information from their political connections.

Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.