This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.

This article develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical finding that multidivision firms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. Headquarters has private information about the capital productivities of its divisions; therefore, capital allocations in the present serve as a signal to divisional managers about future allocations. To facilitate effort provision, headquarters biases capital allocation so as to not disclose productivity differences across divisions or to credibly signal their absence. The capital allocation bias is time-varying and the relationship between the bias and the difference in average division productivities is inversely U-shaped.

Binding lower bounds on interest rates and large government deficits limit the scope of fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate households’ spending through financial intermediaries and firms. Policy makers have thus been implementing unconventional policies that aim to increase households’ spending directly through managing their expectations. We first show theoretically and empirically that higher inflation expectations increase households’ consumption. We then design a difference-in-differences strategy to assess the effectiveness of unconventional fiscal policy and forward guidance, both of which aim to raise aggregate demand via managing expectations. Whereas unconventional fiscal policy increases households’ expectations and spending, forward guidance announcements do not

We use administrative and survey-based micro data to study the relationship between cognitive abilities (IQ), the formation of inflation expectations, and the consumption plans of a representative male population. High-IQ men display 50 % lower forecast errors for inflation than other men. High-IQ men, but not others, have consistent inflation expectations and perceptions over time. In terms of choice, only high-IQ men increase their consumption propensity when expecting higher inflation as the consumer Euler equation prescribes. Education levels, income, other expectations, and socio-economic status, although important, do not explain the variation in expectations and choice by IQ. Recent modelling attempts to incorporate boundedly rational agents into macro models do not fully capture all the facts we document. We discuss which dimensions of expectations formation and choice are important for heterogeneous-agents models of household consumption and for the transmission of fiscal and monetary policy.