I examine whether firms follow the Securities and Exchange Commission’s confidential treatment protocols when redacting potentially material information from their credit agreements. My findings suggest that most firms may not comply with SEC directives: they withhold potentially material information without following the SEC’s confidential treatment protocols and without making interested parties aware of their information disadvantage. I also find evidence consistent with lender and borrower incentives driving the decision to withhold potentially material information from the credit agreement. My findings are consistent with lenders influencing redaction decisions not out of concern about rivals but because they do not want their other borrowers to see the terms. Finally, I find that the Refinitiv / LPC Dealscan database rarely includes redacted fee data, thus leading to potential biases when fees are included in cost of debt measures.

I investigate whether and how syndicate size influences the type of covenants used in debt contracts. Prior theory and evidence suggest renegotiation considerations from coordination difficulties in large syndicates and intertemporal transfers due to relationship lending in small syndicates are factors in the design of covenants. I find that for large syndicates, borrowers and lenders avoid the use of flexibility-reducing covenants that are more likely to impact negatively on value-enhancing corporate policies in good states of the world. This effect becomes stronger when the borrower has fewer outside financing options. Additionally, I find contracts with large syndicates are more likely to have more covenant slack, include performance pricing provisions, have tailored capital expenditure covenants, and principally rely on covenants that are directly linked to the current performance of the borrower. Collectively, these results imply that syndicate size and related renegotiation considerations affect how accounting information is used in debt contracts.

Most loan contracts in the United States contain a provision for lender voting rules. We study the optimal voting rule that allows lenders to waive a covenant violation. When lenders have heterogeneous preferences, lenient voting rules increase the probability of waivers that allow inefficient investments. Stringent voting rules tend to allocate the marginal vote to lenders who deny waivers after false alarms so that they can renegotiate the loan to extract value from the firm, which incurs deadweight costs. In equilibrium, the optimal voting rule balances these two forces to improve contracting efficiency. We derive and empirically test comparative statics on how the optimal voting rule varies with lenders’ preferences and the borrower's accounting properties. Our model offers a rationale for the prevalent use of voting rule clauses in syndicated loan contracts.

We use required 8-K filings around major borrowings to shed light on firms’ choices of whether to comply with SEC disclosure rules. Exploiting within-firm variation, we find that firms are more likely to hide loans with high spreads and tight financial covenants. We further find that firms appear to exploit the ambiguity of the definition of materiality, as they are more likely to selectively disclose (hide) “immaterial” loans when interest rates are low (high). Firms are less likely to hide loans when investors anticipate borrowing during asset acquisition, when firms are followed by more equity analysts or receive more investor attention, and when the firms’ stock prices are more volatile. Lastly, we provide evidence that the SEC does not rigorously enforce compliance with 8-K loan disclosures.

We examine whether firms hold more cash in the face of tax uncertainty. Because of gray areas in the tax law and aggressive tax avoidance, the total amount of tax that a firm will pay is uncertain at the time it files its returns. The tax authorities can challenge and disallow the firm’s tax positions, demanding additional cash tax payments. We hypothesize that firms facing greater tax uncertainty hold cash to satisfy these potential future demands. We find that both domestic firms and multinational firms hold larger cash balances when subject to greater tax uncertainty. In terms of economic significance, we find that the effect of tax uncertainty on cash holdings is comparable to that of repatriation taxes. Our evidence adds to knowledge about the real effects of tax avoidance and provides a tax-based precautionary explanation for why there is such wide variation in cash holdings across firms.