This paper addresses the link between trade exposure and wage volatility. First, it shows, in a simple model, that trade exposure magnifies the impact of domestic productivity shocks on industry-specific labor demand, particularly for the less export-intensive industries, and that, if labor is not perfectly mobile, this implies a rise in wage volatility. Then, it tests these predictions, using industry data. The empirical results confirm that wage volatility increases with an industry's degree of openness, and that it declines with an increase in the industry's export intensity.

We analyze the impact of corruption on bilateral trade, highlighting its dual role in terms of extortion and evasion. Corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the importing country extort bribes from exporters (extortion effect); however, with high tariffs, corruption may be trade enhancing when corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (evasion effect). We derive and estimate a corruption-augmented gravity model, where the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and contingent on tariffs. Empirically, corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high-tariff environments (covering 5% to 14% of the observations) their marginal effect is trade enhancing.