Before completing merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, acquiring firms conduct due diligence. This process provides acquiring firms with a more informed assessment of the expected costs, benefits, and risks of an acquisition and offers one last opportunity to renegotiate or terminate an M&A transaction. However, acquiring firms must trade off the costs and benefits of performing additional due diligence versus completing the acquisition. Based on an analysis of the time to negotiate the acquisition agreement and complete the transaction, I predict and find that competitive pressures, short‐term financial reporting incentives, and agency problems are associated with less due diligence. I also find that less due diligence is associated with lower post‐acquisition profitability, a higher probability of acquisition‐related goodwill impairments, and lower quality fair value estimates for the acquired assets and liabilities. These findings highlight due diligence as an important factor explaining cross‐sectional variation in post‐acquisition performance and financial reporting for business combinations.

This study investigates the role of financial reporting quality in merger and acquisition (M&A) deals that are ultimately terminated (i.e., go bust). If a target is a U.S. publicly traded company, an acquirer’s initial assessment of the potential benefits associated with the acquisition of the company is based on publicly available information. Generally, the acquirer obtains limited private information from the target prior to announcing the deal, but engages in transactional due diligence after signing the acquisition agreement to affirm that the financial reporting warranties made by the target are accurate. We construct a low‐quality financial reporting score based on measures prior research identifies as being associated with less reliable, less relevant, and less precise financial reporting. We find that acquirers offer higher premiums for targets with low‐quality financial reporting. However, we also find that low‐quality financial reporting increases the likelihood of deal renegotiation, and contributes to the probability of deals going bust. We document that failed targets are more likely to restate their financial statements after the announcement of the deal, supporting our conjecture that low‐quality financial reporting contributes to deals being terminated. Our research develops a new measure of low‐quality financial reporting, documents that the measure is related to M&A deal outcomes and financial restatements, and provides insights into the consequences of M&A transactional due diligence.

This paper examines the association between ineffective internal control over financial reporting and the profitability of insider trading. We predict and find that the profitability of insider trading is significantly greater in firms disclosing material weaknesses in internal control relative to firms with effective control. The positive association is present in the years leading up to the disclosure of material weaknesses, but disappears after remediation of the internal control problems. We find insider trading profitability is even greater when insiders are more likely to act in their own self-interest as indicated by auditors’ weak “tone at the top” adverse internal control opinions and this incremental profitability is driven by insider selling. Our research identifies a new setting where shareholders are most at risk for wealth transfers via insider trading and highlights market consequences of weak “tone at the top”.

This study examines whether auditor KAM disclosures about M&A transactions predict future performance outcomes. We find that auditors make more M&A KAM disclosures when M&A transactions are larger, involve targets with greater information asymmetry, and are subject to greater overpayment risk. When auditors disclose M&A KAMs in the acquisition year, we find an increased risk of larger goodwill impairments and that the association between acquired goodwill and changes in companies’ subsequent operating performance are significantly lower compared to when auditors do not issue an M&A KAM. We also find that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is incrementally higher when subsequent operating performance is poor and auditors issue an M&A KAM compared to when they do not. Collectively, our findings suggest that these auditor disclosures reflect uncertainty that predicts weak post-acquisition performance and forced CEO turnover, incremental to other indicators of failed acquisition strategies.

This research evaluates whether reporting incentives and consequences change under the new lease accounting standard. Under prior guidance (SFAS 13), we predict and find firms with high financing cost sensitivities to leverage have greater incentive to finance investments with operating leases. Under the new lease accounting standard (ASU 2016-02), we predict and find this leverage incentive remains but is reduced, consistent with the FASB’s objective to limit opportunities to structure lease contracts for balance sheet purposes. Under ASU 2016-02, we also predict and find that the leverage incentive encourages firms to reduce operating lease liabilities by decreasing the duration of minimum lease payments. Lastly, we predict and find that firms use fewer operating leases under both SFAS 13 and ASU 2016-02 when managers’ income objectives exclude depreciation and/or interest expense. These findings suggest reporting incentives remain post ASU 2016-02 that encourage firms to structure leases to achieve accounting outcomes. Data Availability: This study uses licensed data from a variety of sources (see Appendix A for a detailed list of providers).

Under U.S. GAAP, firms recognize assets acquired in business combinations at fair value. Similarly, in taxable asset acquisitions firms adjust the tax basis of assets to fair value. Managers can increase the present value of future tax savings by allocating a greater portion of the purchase price to shorter‐lived assets than to goodwill or indefinite‐lived intangibles. However, this tax planning strategy imposes a financial reporting cost because it reduces book income following the acquisition; all else equal, allocations to shorter‐lived depreciable assets increase book depreciation expense, whereas allocations to goodwill and indefinite‐lived intangibles do not increase book amortization expense. We exploit the features of taxable asset acquisitions to investigate trade‐offs between tax and financial reporting incentives. We predict and find greater allocations to depreciable versus intangible assets when managers have strong tax incentives and weak financial reporting incentives. However, we also find that strong financial reporting incentives moderate the effects of strong tax incentives. These findings contribute new evidence to the literature on the importance of nontax costs in tax planning decisions