This paper constructs a model of non-balanced economic growth. The main economic force is the combination of differences in factor proportions and capital deepening. Capital deepening tends to increase the relative output of the sector with a greater capital share, but simultaneously induces a reallocation of capital and labor away from that sector. We first illustrate this force using a general two-sector model. We then investigate it further using a class of models with constant elasticity of substitution between two sectors and Cobb-Douglas production functions in each sector. In this class of models, non-balanced growth is shown to be consistent with an asymptotic equilibrium with constant interest rate and capital share in national income. We also show that for realistic parameter values, the model generates dynamics that are broadly consistent with US data. In particular, the model generates more rapid growth of employment in less capital-intensive sectors, more rapid growth of real output in more capital-intensive sectors and aggregate behavior in line with the Kaldor facts. Finally, we construct and analyze a model of "non-balanced endogenous growth," which extends the main results of the paper to an economy with endogenous anddirected technical change. This model shows that equilibrium will typically involve endogenous non-balanced technological progress.

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes.

This paper examines the implications of regulatory change for input mix and technology choices of regulated industries. We study the increase in the relative price of labor faced by U.S. hospitals that resulted from the move from full cost to partial cost reimbursement under the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) reform. Using the interaction of hospitals' pre-PPS Medicare share of patient days with the introduction of PPS, we document substantial increases in capital-labor ratios and declines in labor inputs following PPS. Most interestingly, we find that PPS seems to have encouraged the adoption of a range of new medical technologies.

We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72) The domination of an organized minority … over the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority. —Gaetano Mosca (1939, 53).

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in non-democratic societies where institutions do not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it, and it needs to be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of its subcoalitions should be able to secede and become the new ruling coalition. We present both an axiomatic approach that captures these notions and determines a (generically) unique ruling coalition and the analysis of a dynamic game of coalition formation that encompasses these ideas. We establish that the subgame-perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game coincide with the set of ruling coalitions resulting from the axiomatic approach. A key insight of our analysis is that a coalition is made self-enforcing by the failure of its winning subcoalitions to be self-enforcing. This is most simply illustrated by the following example: with “majority rule”, two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing and consequently, three-person coalitions are self-enforcing (unless one player is disproportionately powerful). We also characterize the structure of ruling coalitions. For example, we determine the conditions under which ruling coalitions are robust to small changes in the distribution of power and when they are fragile. We also show that when the distribution of power across individuals is relatively equal and there is majoritarian voting, only certain sizes of coalitions (e.g. with majority rule, coalitions of size 1, 3, 7, 15, etc.) can be the ruling coalition.

Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We present instrumental-variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy. The cross-country correlation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years. This pattern is consistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures.