Government employment programs for low-skilled workers typically emphasize rapid placement of participants into jobs, of which many are temporary-help jobs. Using data from Detroit’s welfare-to-work program and the Chernozhukov-Hansen instrumental variables quantile regression method, we find that neither direct-hire nor temporary-help job placements significantly affect the lower tail of the earnings distribution. In the upper tail, direct-hire placements yield sizable earnings increases for over half of participants, while temporary-help placements yield significant earnings losses at higher quantiles. Our results cast doubt on the efficacy of employment programs’ exclusive focus on rapid job placement and their widespread reliance on temporary-help placements.

The recent fall of labor's share of GDP in numerous countries is well-documented, but its causes are poorly understood. We sketch a “superstar firm” model where industries are increasingly characterized by “winner take most” competition, leading a small number of highly profitable (and low labor share) firms to command growing market share. Building on Autor et al. (2017), we evaluate and confirm two core claims of the superstar firm hypothesis: the concentration of sales among firms within industries has risen across much of the private sector; and industries with larger increases in concentration exhibit a larger decline in labor's share.