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What Do Editors Maximize? Evidence from Four Economics Journals

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2020 102(1), 195-217
We study editorial decisions using anonymized submissions matched to citations at four leading economics journals. We develop a benchmark model in which editors maximize the expected quality of accepted papers and citations are unbiased measures of quality. We then generalize the model to allow different quality thresholds, systematic gaps between citations and quality, and a direct impact of publication on citations. We find that referee recommendations are strong predictors of citations and that editors follow these recommendations closely. We document two deviations from the benchmark model. First, papers by highly published authors receive more citations, conditional on the referees' recommendations and publication status. Second, recommendations of highly published referees are equally predictive of future citations, yet editors give their views significantly more weight.

Are Referees and Editors in Economics Gender Neutral?*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2020 135(1), 269-327
Abstract We study the role of gender in the evaluation of economic research using submissions to four leading journals. We find that referee gender has no effect on the relative assessment of female- versus male-authored papers, suggesting that any differential biases of male referees are negligible. To determine whether referees as a whole impose different standards for female authors, we compare citations for female- and male-authored papers, holding constant referee evaluations and other characteristics. We find that female-authored papers receive about 25% more citations than observably similar male-authored papers. Editors largely follow the referees, resulting in a 1.7 percentage point lower probability of a revise and resubmit verdict for papers with female authors relative to a citation-maximizing benchmark. In their desk rejection decisions, editors treat female authors more favorably, though they still impose a higher bar than would be implied by citation maximization. We find no differences in the informativeness of female versus male referees or in the weight that editors place on the recommendations of female versus male referees. We also find no differences in editorial delays for female- versus male-authored papers.