This paper explores the equity of the way losses from bank insolvencies and their avoidance through intervention by the authorities have been distributed over creditors, depositors, owners and the population at large in transition and emerging economies. It suggests a number of regulatory reforms that would alter the balance between seeking to avoid insolvency and lowering the costs of insolvency should it occur. It considers whether a lex specialis for dealing with problem banks by prompt corrective action and if necessary resolving them if their net worth falls to zero, at little or no cost to the taxpayer can be applied in the circumstances of transition and emerging economies.

This paper considers the joint role of macroeconomic, structural and bank-specific factors in explaining the occurrence of banking problems in the nineteen Eastern European transition countries over the last decade. With data at the individual bank level we show, using a discrete time survival model, that all three factors interact in their impact and have a rich dynamic profile, which underlines the highly volatile cycles challenging the stability of banks in this region. A fragile funding basis accompanied by high exposure to market risk in an environment of reforms and macroeconomic disturbances is the typical precursor of bank distress.

Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provides a more efficient mechanism for dealing with problem banks operating in more than one European country. In a PCA framework, a bank's losses are likely to be substantially reduced. This reduction in the losses to deposit insurance and governments will improve the problem of allocating those losses across the various insurance schemes and make it less likely that any deposit insurer will renege on its obligations in a cross-border banking crisis. This paper presents a stylized mechanism aimed at dealing with the cross-border agency problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups in the European Union (EU). The authors assume that PCA policies have been implemented by the national supervisors and explore the institutional changes needed in Europe if PCA is to be effective as an incentive compatible mechanism. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups to supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank of a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved.