AbstractHow does CEO political ideology influence the pay disparity between a CEO and typical firm employees? Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we postulate that politically liberal CEOs are more inclined to address within‐firm vertical pay disparity versus conservative or neutral CEOs, because liberals attend more closely to potential inequality issues and are more open to social changes. We furthermore contend that the effect of CEO political ideology varies across certain contextual factors. Results based on a sample of United States public firms support our arguments. Our study contributes to the literature on income inequality by highlighting CEO political ideology as a crucial determinant and investigating the boundary conditions.

ABSTRACT Drawing on research on political ideology and the HRM literature, we postulate that the degree to which CEOs are politically liberal will affect firms' use of employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) and work‐family benefits in two distinct ways. First, political liberalism increases CEOs' motivation to practice egalitarianism (including more equal compensation). Second, liberalism steers CEOs to be open to practices that foster social changes. Hence, we contend that CEO political liberalism will increase the firm's likelihood of implementing ESOP and work‐family benefits. Further, we suggest that certain contingencies will moderate these associations. Results derived from a dataset of Fortune 500 firms based in the US from 2002 to 2018 ( n = 2,363) support our arguments. We measured ESOP by a binary variable indicating whether a firm implemented any stock ownership program in a year, while work‐family benefits was captured by a dummy suggesting whether a firm had a work‐life balance policy in a year. Our findings contribute to the literature on HRM practice implementation and political ideology.

This study examines the impact of bribery within the home country on firm exports by developing two contrasting hypotheses. On the one hand, preferential treatment resulting from government officials in exchange for bribes may promote exports by enhancing efficiency and enabling bribing firms to better compete in foreign markets. On the other hand, preferential treatment resulting from bribes may decrease exports by providing firms with more established positions within the domestic market diminishing the incentive to explore foreign markets. Adopting the three‐stage least squares method, we test these competing arguments using a sample of firms operating within transition economies. We find that bribery within the home country decreases rather than increases firm exports. The implications of our findings are discussed . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.