One reason why funds charge different prices to their investors is that they face different demand curves. One source of differentiation is asset retention: Performance-sensitive investors migrate from worse to better prospects, taking their performance sensitivity with them. In the cross-section we show that past attrition significantly influences the current pricing of retail but not institutional funds. In time-series we show that the repricing of retail funds after merging in new shareholders is predicted by the estimated effect on its demand curve. This result is robust to other influences on repricing, including asset and account-size changes.

One reason why funds charge different prices to their investors is that they face different demand curves. One source of differentiation is asset retention: Performance-sensitive investors migrate from worse to better prospects, taking their performance sensitivity with them. In the cross-section we show that past attrition significantly influences the current pricing of retail but not institutional funds. In time-series we show that the repricing of retail funds after merging in new shareholders is predicted by the estimated effect on its demand curve. This result is robust to other influences on repricing, including asset and account-size changes.

This article provides a comprehensive study of survivorship issues using the mutual fund data of Carhart (1997). We demonstrate theoretically that when survival depends on multiperiod performance, the survivorship bias in average performance typically increases with the sample length. This is empirically relevant because evidence suggests a multiyear survival rule for U.S. mutual funds. In the data we find the annual bias increases from 0.07% for 1-year samples to 1% for samples longer than 15 years. We find that survivor conditioning weakens evidence of performance persistence. Finally, we explain how survivor conditioning affects the relation between performance and fund characteristics.

With a year of equity loans by a major lender, we measure the effect of actual short-selling costs and constraints on trading strategies that involve short-selling. We find the loans of initial public offering (IPOs), DotCom, large-cap, growth and low-momentum stocks to be cheap relative to the strategies’ documented profits and that investors who can short only stocks that are cheap and easy to borrow can enjoy at least some of the profits of unconstrained investors. Most IPOs are loaned on their first settlement days and throughout their first months, and the underperformance around lockup expiration is significant even for the IPOs that are cheap and easy to borrow. The effect of short-selling frictions appears strongest in merger arbitrage. Acquirers’ stock is expensive to borrow, especially when the acquirer is small, though the major influence on trading profits is not through expense but availability.

This article provides a comprehensive study of survivorship issues using the mutual fund data of Carhart (1997). We demonstrate theoretically that when survival depends on multiperiod performance, the survivorship bias in average performance typically increases with the sample length. This is empirically relevant because evidence suggests a multiyear survival rule for U.S. mutual funds. In the data we find the annual bias increases from 0.07% for 1-year samples to 1% for samples longer than 15 years. We find that survivor conditioning weakens evidence of performance persistence. Finally, we explain how survivor conditioning affects the relation between performance and fund characteristics.

ABSTRACT We present evidence that fund managers inflate quarter‐end portfolio prices with last‐minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inflation ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large‐cap funds to well over 2 percent for small‐cap funds. We find that the cross section of inflation matches the cross section of incentives from the flow/performance relation, that a surge of trading in the quarter's last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the inflation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inflate, controlling for the stocks' size and performance.