Most of the British electricity supply industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators supply bulk electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this should be highly competitive, we show that the Nash equilibrium in supply schedules implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Further simulations, to show the effect of entry by 1994, produce somewhat lower prices, at the cost of excessive entry; subdividing the generators into five firms would produce better results.

Most of the British electricity supply industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators supply bulk electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this should be highly competitive, the authors show that the Nash equilibrium in supply schedules implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Further simulations, to show the effect of entry by 1994, produce somewhat lower prices at the cost of excessive entry; subdividing the generators into five firms would produce better results. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.