A Spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates, resulting in substantial tax differentials. Using administrative data, we find that conditional on moving, taxes have a significant effect on location choice. A 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate for a region relative to others increases the probability of moving to that region by 1.7 percentage points. We estimate an elasticity of the number of top taxpayers with respect to net-of-tax rates of 0.85. The mechanical increase in tax revenue due to higher tax rates is larger than the loss in tax revenue from the net outflow of migration.

Abstract This paper studies the effects of transitioning from a system of sales taxes to a value-added tax (VAT) on firm-level outcomes. We construct a dataset of product- and state-specific tax rates before and after India gradually switched from a sales tax to a VAT. Exploiting staggered state-level adoptions, we first show that following the transition, effective tax rates declined substantially and complexity as measured by various proxies generally also fell. We then show that sales increased by 57% in the medium run. The reform resulted in increased earnings for workers and higher amounts of capital and digital accounting.

This paper critically surveys the growing literature on the policy choices of local governments. First, we identify various reasons for local government policy interactions, including fiscal competition, bidding for firms, yardstick competition, expenditure spillovers, and Tiebout sorting. We discuss theoretically what parameters should be estimated to determine the reason for competition among local governments. We emphasize how the policy outcomes emerging from this competition are affected by the presence of constraints imposed by higher-level governments. Second, we integrate theoretical and empirical analyses on the effects of fiscal decentralization on mobility, spillovers, fiscal externalities, economic outcomes, and distributional issues. Third, we identify key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of strategic interactions among local governments and highlight recent quasi-experimental evidence that has attempted to identify the mechanism at work. Finally, a synthesis model, containing multiple mechanisms and fiscal instruments, resolves some puzzles and provides guidance for future research. (JEL D72,H20, H71, H72, H73, H77, R51)