We describe the empirical relationship between local government boundaries and residential segregation in the United States. First, we study recent changes in the distribution of segregation within and between local governments in all metropolitan areas, using census block data on residential demographics over the period 1990–2020. We find that segregation across local government boundaries explains a substantial share of racial stratification, which has changed only little over the last thirty years. Next, we use spatial regression discontinuity methods to distinguish between household sorting due to neighborhood amenities and public goods provided by local governments. The prevalence of demographic discontinuities at local government boundaries suggest that between-jurisdiction segregation patterns cannot be explained solely by proximity to neighborhood amenities. We discuss implications for policy, showing that both between-jurisdiction segregation and jurisdictional discontinuities can partly explain the correlation between total segregation and racial gaps in educational outcomes.

This article identifies which investments in school facilities help students and which are valued by homeowners. Using novel data on school district bonds, test scores, and house prices across 29 U.S. states and a research design based on narrowly decided elections with staggered timing, we find that increased capital spending in schools significantly improves test scores and is efficient on average. However, the effects vary widely depending on the type of project and the characteristics of the school district. Investments in essential infrastructure, such as HVAC systems or pollutant removal, yield notable improvements in student performance, while expenditures on athletic facilities show no measurable academic benefit. Socioeconomically disadvantaged districts gain disproportionately from capital investments, even after accounting for project type, yet these districts typically underinvest in such projects.

Small firms struggle to grow beyond a few employees. We introduce monitoring devices into commuter minibuses in Kenya and randomize which minibus owners have access to the data using a novel mobile app. We find that treated vehicle owners modify the terms of the contract to induce higher effort and lower risk taking from their drivers. This reduces firm costs and increases firm profitability. There is suggestive evidence that some firms expand. These results suggest that small firms may be able to utilize monitoring technologies to overcome problems of moral hazard and enhance their profitability.