Governments use policy experiments to facilitate learning, but the nature and effects of these experiments remain unclear. We analyze China's policy experimentation since 1980—among the most systematic in history—and document three facts. First, most experiments exhibit positive sample selection. Second, local politicians exert excessive efforts during experiments that are not replicable during policies’ national rollout. Third, the central government is not fully sophisticated when interpreting experimentation outcomes. These facts suggest that policy learning may be biased and national policies may be distorted. Thus, while China’s institutions enable experimentation at an unparalleled scale, the complex political environments can also limit effective policy learning.

We show that the likelihood of a liquidity crunch in wholesale U.S. dollar funding markets depends on levels of reserve balances at the financial institutions that are the most active intermediaries of these markets. Heightened risk of an imminent liquidity crunch is signaled by significant delays in intraday payments to these large financial institutions over the prior two weeks. Our study contributes to the broader dialogue surrounding the Federal Reserve’s ongoing quantitative tightening.

ABSTRACT Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are stressed. This elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt‐overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to a credit‐sensitive reference rate like the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). We show that transition to risk‐free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit supply is offset if drawdowns are expected to be deposited at the same bank, which happened at some of the largest banks during the global financial crisis and COVID recession.