Abstract Blockchains represent a novel application of cryptography and information technology to age-old problems of financial record-keeping, and they may lead to far-reaching changes in corporate governance. Many major players in the financial industry have began to invest in this new technology, and stock exchanges have proposed using blockchains as a new method for trading corporate equities and tracking their ownership. This essay evaluates the potential implications of these changes for managers, institutional investors, small shareholders, auditors, and other parties involved in corporate governance. The lower cost, greater liquidity, more accurate record-keeping, and transparency of ownership offered by blockchains may significantly upend the balance of power among these cohorts.

We investigate the importance of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, in executives’ stock option exercise decisions. We develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the traditional measure of risk, equity volatility. We show that each variable has a significant effect on the timing of option exercises, with volatility causing executives to hold options longer to preserve option value, and ambiguity increasing the tendency for executives to exercise early.