Union Carbide's chemical leak in Bhopal, India during December 1984 resulted in approximately 4,000 deaths and 200,000 injuries. This study examines the market reaction of chemical firms other than Union Carbide to this catastrophe. Evidence indicates that a significant negative intra-industry reaction occurred. However, firms with more extensive environmental disclosures in their financial report prior to the chemical leak experienced a less negative reaction than firms with less extensive disclosures. This result suggests that investors interpreted such disclosures as a positive sign of the firm managing its exposure to future regulatory costs.

We model the decision to replace durable capital when intensity is variable. Decisions of this type include land-redevelopment decisions where the density of residential or commercial development is a choice variable as well as capital-replacement decisions where capacity is variable. We provide a general yet simple formulation of the problem using an optimal-stopping framework. We characterize the value of the project, the timing of investment, and the intensity of development. We show that intensity interacts in important ways with timing, taxes, and project values. The ability to vary intensity raises hurdle rents and delays development decisions.

We analyze the problem faced by a financially weak independent inventor when selling a valuable, but easily imitated, invention for which no property rights exist. The inventor can protect his or her intellectual property by negotiating a contingent contract (with a buyer) prior to revealing the invention or, alternatively, the inventor can reveal the invention and then negotiate with the newly informed buyer. Despite the risk of expropriation, we find that, in equilibrium, an inventor with little wealth can expect to appropriate a sizable share of the market value of the invention by adopting the latter approach.

The authors analyze the problem faced by a financially weak independent inventor when selling a valuable, but easily imitated, invention for which no property rights exist. The inventor can protect his or her intellectual property by negotiating a contingent contract (with a buyer) prior to revealing the invention or, alternatively, the inventor can reveal the invention and then negotiate with the newly informed buyer. Despite the risk of expropriation, the authors find that, in equilibrium, an inventor with little wealth can expect to appropriate a sizable share of the market value of the invention by adopting the latter approach.

The authors model the decision to replace durable capital when intensity is variable. Decisions of this type include land-redevelopment decisions where the density of residential or commercial development is a choice variable as well as capital-replacement decisions where capacity is variable. The authors provide a general yet simple formation of the problem using an optimal-stopping framework. They characterize the value of the project, the timing of investment, and the intensity of development. The authors show that intensity interacts in important ways with timing, taxes, and project values. The ability to vary intensity raises hurdle rents and delays development decisions.