ABSTRACT Using a unique hand-collected dataset of purchase obligations, we find that customers’ financial reporting quality is positively associated with future supply contracts, indicating that suppliers are more willing to contract with customers who provide them with better information. Further, the association between customers’ financial reporting quality and future supply contracts is stronger for customers with strong bargaining power, which is consistent with suppliers relying more on financial reports when they have less access to customers’ private information. Collectively, our results suggest that customers’ financial reporting quality plays an important role in influencing suppliers’ decisions to contract with customers for the future supply of goods and services. Data Availability: Data for dependent variable are manually collected and data for all other variables are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D80; M41.

This study investigates how the association between more able managers and firm performance, documented in prior research, is affected by the joint effect of managerial discretion and monitoring quality. We find that higher levels of managerial discretion afford more able managers to further improve firm outcomes only when such discretion is monitored closely to curb more able managers' rent seeking incentives. Our results are robust to a battery of additional and sensitivity analyses that we perform.