Understanding if credit risk is driven mostly by idiosyncratic firm characteristics or by systematic factors is an important issue for the assessment of financial stability. By exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments, we observe that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency towards excessive risk-taking. Using an extensive dataset with detailed information for more than 30000 firms, we show that default probabilities are influenced by several firm-specific characteristics. When time-effect controls or macroeconomic variables are also taken into account, the results improve substantially. Hence, though the firms’ financial situation has a central role in explaining default probabilities, macroeconomic conditions are also very important when assessing default probabilities over time.

When banks are hit by a severe liquidity shock, central banks have a key role as lenders of last resort. Despite the well-established importance of this mechanism, it is challenging to analyze it empirically. We explore a unique setting in which banks suddenly lost access to market funding due to contagion fears at the onset of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Using monthly data at the loan, bank, and firm level, we test the role of the central bank in a scenario of imminent collapse. We find that the liquidity obtained from the central bank played a key role in temporarily supporting the supply of credit to the real economy. However, the subdued loan demand, together with moral suasion and carry trade incentives, led to an increase in banks’ sovereign bond holdings using central bank funding.

We study local loan conditions when banks close branches. In places where branch closures do not take place, firms that purposely switch banks receive a sixty-three basis points (bps) discount. However, after the closure of nearby branches of their credit-granting banks, firms that locally and hurriedly transfer to other banks receive no such discount. Yet, the loan default rate for the latter (more expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the former (cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that transfer firms are of “better” quality than switching firms. In sum, even if local markets remain competitive, when banks close branches, firms lose.

Sovereigns usually back up their deposit insurance arrangements to lend them credibility. When the sovereign is in distress, the credibility of deposit insurance might be threatened, with detrimental effects to financial stability. We investigate the behavior of depositors during the euro area sovereign debt crisis to understand the importance of deposit insurance credibility. We find that depositors responded to foreign banks’ decision to convert their subsidiaries into branches. By relocating their deposits into these newly formed branches during a period of sovereign distress, depositors became insured by a deposit insurance scheme with a stronger fiscal backstop. These results document a novel channel through which sovereign-bank links can be reinforced during a crisis: the credibility of deposit insurance.

We use variation in the access to a government credit certification program to estimate the financial and real effects of supporting small firms. This program was first implemented during the global financial crisis, but has remained active ever since, allowing us to analyze its effects both during recessions and recoveries. Eligible firms have access to government loan guarantees and a credit quality certification. We estimate real effects using a multidimensional regression discontinuity design. We find that eligible firms borrow more and at lower rates than non-eligible firms, allowing them to increase investment and employment during crises. Industry-level analysis shows reduced productivity heterogeneity in more exposed industries, which is consistent with improved credit allocation. However, when the economy is recovering the effects of the program are less pronounced and centered on the certification component. The cost-per-job in the recovery period is half of the one estimated for the crisis period (5784€ and 11,788€, respectively).

In this paper, we investigate what happens to firms after they default on their bank loans. We approach this question by establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of corporate default and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique dataset from Portugal, we observe that half of the corporate default episodes last 5 quarters. Most firms continue to have access to credit immediately after resolving default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have more difficulties in regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default was long and severe, if they borrow from only one bank or if they default with their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting firms record another default in the future. We observe that firms with repeated defaults are, on average, smaller and experience longer and more severe defaults.

We measure how cuts to public procurement propagate through the banking system in a financial crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis, the Portuguese government cut procurement spending by 4.3 percent of GDP. We find that this cut saddled banks with nonperforming loans from government contractors, which led to a persistent reduction in credit supply to other firms. We estimate a bank-level elasticity of credit supply with respect to procurement demand of 2.5. In a general equilibrium model, our findings point to large effects of fiscal policy on credit supply and output in a crisis.