We study 130 large asset downsizings in 1985–1994. We find that downsizings are most often accomplished by selling assets. The decision to downsize is negatively related to operating performance at both the firm and industry levels and is positively related to firm debt ratio and level of diversification. Following their downsizings, the sample firms are more focused, have lower debt ratios, and experience statistically significant increases in operating performance. These results suggest that large downsizings are efficient responses to declining circumstances. However, we also find that their occurrence is strongly dependent upon an active market for corporate control.

The existing literature reports insignificant `total' exposure for multinational or exporting firms, where total exposure incorporates both firm-specific and macroeconomic effects. We propose a dual-effect hypothesis to explain this result which seemingly contradicts conventional wisdom. According to our proposed hypothesis, firms are affected by both the domestic economy and foreign markets. These effects are at least partially offsetting for exporters and additive for importers. The resulting predictions of insignificant total exposure for exporters and positive total exposure for importers are borne out in our tests. The literature also reports insignificant `residual' exposure for multinationals or exporting firms, where residual exposure estimates the firm-specific exposure. This result is explained by biases in the residual exposure estimates introduced by the choice of the value-weighted market index as the control portfolio. We propose an equally-weighted portfolio of purely domestic firms as an alternative portfolio to reduce such biases and report significantly negative exposure for exporters and significantly positive exposure for importers, as predicted by theory.

We report that traditional seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are no longer firms' preferred choice for raising seasoned public equity. Traditional offerings have recently been surpassed by shelf-registered offerings in terms of both annual frequency and total capital raised. This represents a dramatic shift from the 1980s, during which the overwhelming majority of firms favored traditional over shelf-registered offerings. We find that the growth in shelf use is related to firms increasingly valuing and using the option feature of shelf registration to defer offerings. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the way firms now use shelf offerings resolves the shelf under-certification problem and results in no larger market penalties and significantly lower underwriter fees relative to non-shelf offerings. Finally, firms often use universal shelf filings and choose between debt and equity offerings based on the prevailing relative market conditions.

Empirical studies on whether investments are sensitive to cash flows in imperfect markets often report conflicting results and have been criticized on conceptual and methodological grounds. Our study mitigates some of these problems using a research design that relates changes in investment–cash flow sensitivity to changes in the bid-ask spread measure of information asymmetry surrounding (i) implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and (ii) deregulation of firms in the Transportation, Telecommunication, and Petroleum and Natural Gas industries. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that information asymmetry decreases following SOX and that there is a corresponding decrease in the investment–cash flow sensitivity, pre- to post-SOX. Further, greater decreases in information asymmetry following SOX are associated with greater decreases in investment–cash flow sensitivity. The results for the deregulation sample are also consistent with our hypothesis, wherein we observe an increase in information asymmetry and corresponding increase in the investment–cash flow sensitivity following deregulation.

ABSTRACT While it has been known for some time that, under uncertainty, the original version of the Fisher hypothesis is not precisely correct, empirical researchers have largely ignored this fact. Such an omission has possibly resulted in erroneous conclusions concerning other hypotheses; most notably the impact of prices on the real economy. This paper clarifies some of the previous interpretations of the existing empirical literature and provides a theoretical version of the relation between prices and interest rates. Empirical tests based on both the Livingston survey data and data from time‐series forecasting models provide support for the Fisher effect and the hypothesis that only covariance risk is priced in the Treasury bill market.

While it has been known for some time that, under uncertainty, the original version of the Fisher hypothesis is not precisely correct, empirical researchers have largely ignored this fact. Such an omission has possibly resulted in erroneous conclusions concerning other hypotheses; most notably the impact of prices on the real economy. This paper clarifies some of the previous interpretations of the existing empirical literature and provides a theoretical version of the relation between prices and interest rates. Empirical tests based on both the Livingston survey data and data from time-series forecasting models provide support for the Fisher effect and the hypothesis that only covariance risk is priced in the Treasury bill market.

In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank-specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre-deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank‐specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre‐deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.