This paper analyzes various channels of shock transmission in an economy subject to financial frictions, by incorporating liquidity and default effects on asset prices. We develop a framework in which we can assess financial stability policy by introducing a simplified model of exchange and financial intermediation that captures the effects of shocks on financial and real sectors of the economy. The model allows us to explain essential mechanisms and interactions of financial and real economic variables in a comprehensive, yet intuitive fashion. Our results suggest that liquidity and default in the credit markets should be analyzed contemporaneously when financial, monetary and productivity shocks affect financial stability as well as the real economy.

The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end, we use simplified, thus numerically solvable, versions of our general model [C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos, A Model to Analyse Financial Fragility, Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2003fe13, 2003]. The model incorporates heterogeneous agents, banks and endogenous default, thus allowing various feedback and contagion channels to operate in equilibrium. Such a model leads to different results from those obtained when using a standard representative agent model. For example, there may be a trade-off between efficiency and financial stability, not only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy. Moreover, agents who have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks more effectively by transferring ‘negative externalities’ onto others.

We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary authority extends long-term credit against risky collateral along with its traditional monetary operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can optimally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics and can increase the probability that a crisis occurs.

The financial intermediation wedge of the banking sector used to co-move positively with the federal funds rate, but the post-GFC era saw a disconnect between them. We develop a flexible price dynamic general equilibrium with banks’ liquidity creation to offer an explanation. In a corridor system, the financial wedge and policy rate are shown to co-move, and the pass-through of monetary policy onto both inflation and output obtains. However, the post-GFC floor system obviates the need for the financial wedge to cover the cost of obtaining reserves, so the wedge and the policy rate indeed disconnect in equilibrium; furthermore, we show that the disconnect obstructs monetary expansions from generating inflation. In this environment, tightening bank capital requirement leads to disinflationary pressure. Money-financed fiscal expansions that subsidise non-bank sectors’ borrowing costs improve output and reduce default risks but increase inflation. The model uses banks’ liquidity creation via credit extension to provide a rationale for both the pre-pandemic disinflation and the post-pandemic inflation. The results hold both on the dynamic paths and in the steady state, and the role of money enlarges the Taylor rule determinacy region.

Government interventions as a solution to systemic banking crises continue to receive wide criticism. The new regulatory frameworks advocate banks’ bail-ins and resolutions that do not require governments’ involvement. However, as the recent events with Credit Suisse and Silicon Valley Bank show, the government still plays an active role in rescuing and resolving the bank's problems. We use the financial stability model of Goodhart et al.’s (2005, 2006a) to analyze the effects of various bank policy interventions on banks’ performance during the crisis rescue phase. We then explore whether those interventions work effectively in facilitating bank recovery and whether they reduce systemic risk in the long run. We use a unique granular bank-level dataset from 22 advanced economies covering the 1992–2017 period. We find that bank recapitalization without debt resolution measures does not resolve bank distress. The empirical results document that “bad-bank” resolution is positively correlated with a bank’s recovery as well as lower systemic risk. Those findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the optimal bank resolution architecture during systemic events.

We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or less lending intensive, and the level of lending may be higher or lower. Correcting these three distortions requires a package of three regulations.