[Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U. S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.]

We study the effect of financial constraints on risk and expected returns by extending the investment-based asset pricing framework to incorporate retained earnings, debt, costly equity, and collateral constraints on debt capacity. Quantitative results show that more financially constrained firms are riskier and earn higher expected stock returns than less financially constrained firms. Intuitively, by preventing firms from financing all desired investments, collateral constraints restrict the flexibility of firms in smoothing dividend streams in the face of aggregate shocks. The inflexibility mechanism also gives rise to a convex relation between market leverage and expected stock returns.

We document a new stylized fact, that the relationship between the volatility of oil futures prices and the slope of the forward curve is nonmonotone and has a V-shape. This pattern cannot be generated by standard models that emphasize storage. We develop an equilibrium model of oil production in which investment is irreversible and capacity constrained. Investment constraints affect firms' investment decisions and imply that the supply elasticity changes over time. Since demand shocks must be absorbed by changes in prices or changes in supply, time-varying supply elasticity results in time-varying volatility of futures prices. Estimating this model, we show it is quantitatively consistent with the V-shape relationship between the volatility of futures prices and the slope of the forward curve.

[We take a simple q-theory model and ask how well it can explain external financing anomalies, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our central insight is that optimal investment is an important driving force of these anomalies. The model simultaneously reproduces procyclical equity issuance waves, the negative relation between investment and average returns, long-term underperformance following equity issues, positive long-term drift following cash distributions, the mean-reverting operating performance of issuing and cashdistributing firms, and the failure of the in explaining the long-term stock-price drifts. However, the model cannot fully capture the magnitude of the positive drift following cash distributions observed in the data.]

We document a new stylized fact, that the relationship between the volatility of oil futures prices and the slope of the forward curve is nonmonotone and has a V‐shape. This pattern cannot be generated by standard models that emphasize storage. We develop an equilibrium model of oil production in which investment is irreversible and capacity constrained. Investment constraints affect firms' investment decisions and imply that the supply elasticity changes over time. Since demand shocks must be absorbed by changes in prices or changes in supply, time‐varying supply elasticity results in time‐varying volatility of futures prices. Estimating this model, we show it is quantitatively consistent with the V‐shape relationship between the volatility of futures prices and the slope of the forward curve.

We examine optimal leverage for a downstream firm relying on implicit (self-enforcing) contracts with a supplier. Performing a leveraged recapitalization prior to bargaining increases the firm's share of total surplus. However, the resulting debt overhang limits the range of credible bonuses, resulting in low input quality. Optimal financial structure trades off bargaining benefits of debt with inefficiency resulting from overhang. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that leverage increases with supplier bargaining power (e.g., unionization rates) and decreases with utilization of non-verifiable inputs (e.g., human capital).

Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U.S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

We study the effect of financial constraints on risk and expected returns by extending the investment‐based asset pricing framework to incorporate retained earnings, debt, costly equity, and collateral constraints on debt capacity. Quantitative results show that more financially constrained firms are riskier and earn higher expected stock returns than less financially constrained firms. Intuitively, by preventing firms from financing all desired investments, collateral constraints restrict the flexibility of firms in smoothing dividend streams in the face of aggregate shocks. The inflexibility mechanism also gives rise to a convex relation between market leverage and expected stock returns.

We take a simple q-theory model and ask how well it can explain external financing anomalies, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our central insight is that optimal investment is an important driving force of these anomalies. The model simultaneously reproduces procyclical equity issuance waves, the negative relation between investment and average returns, long-term underperformance following equity issues, positive long-term drift following cash distributions, the mean-reverting operating performance of issuing and cash-distributing firms, and the failure of the CAPM in explaining the long-term stock-price drifts. However, the model cannot fully capture the magnitude of the positive drift following cash distributions observed in the data. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.