Mandated public dissemination of over-the-counter transactions in corporate debt securities via the TRACE system dramatically reduces the average short-term market reaction to rating downgrades by both issuer-paid and investor-paid rating agencies. Ratings become relatively more accurate predictors of default and more sensitive to innovations in credit spreads after the introduction of dissemination. However, in transparent markets, they provide no significant information about future defaults beyond that provided by credit spreads. Dissemination increases the efficiency of information aggregation and transmission in bond markets, thereby reducing the incremental information content of ratings and the price impact of rating revisions.

A significant proportion of the debt issued by investment‐grade firms has maturities greater than 20 years. In this paper we provide evidence that gap‐filling behavior is an important determinant of these very long‐term issues. Using data on individual corporate debt issues between 1987 and 2009, we find that gap‐filling behavior is more prominent in the very long end of the maturity spectrum where the required risk capital makes arbitrage costly. In addition, changes in the supply of long‐term government bonds affect not just the choice of maturity but also the overall level of corporate borrowing.

In 2012, the US Department of Labor imposed new disclosure requirements for indirect fees that 401(k) retirement plan service providers earn through revenue sharing agreements with mutual funds. This paper examines the impact of these fee disclosure requirements on the level and structure of fees paid by retirement plans, as well as service providers’ ability to price discriminate between plan sponsors of different sophistication. We document that the new disclosure requirements are associated with a substitution of direct fees for indirect fees and a reduction in total fees paid by smaller plans, and that mutual fund providers responded by introducing retirement fund share classes with lower 12b-1 fees.

Using a large sample of leveraged loans, we provide evidence that, despite having fewer creditor control rights, covenant-lite (Cov-Lite) loans have similar recovery rates and significantly lower spreads than loans with maintenance covenants. We find that the propensity to borrow Cov-Lite is related to various proxies for the reputational capital of a borrowing firm’s private equity sponsor. We construct a simple model to illustrate the relationship between reputational capital, covenants, and loan spreads in the leveraged loan market. Our model illustrates how reputational capital can substitute for covenants in mitigating agency costs of debt, leading to lower loan spreads for Cov-Lite loans.

Priority spreading refers to the practice of firms increasing their reliance on secured and subordinated debt and reducing their reliance on senior debt as their credit quality deteriorates. We argue that priority spreading occurs because security provides creditors with greater protection from dilution from other creditors than do covenants that prioritize payments. Consistent with this argument, we find that secured bank creditors are rarely diluted by junior creditors in distressed restructurings, whereas senior unsecured creditors are frequently diluted, exogenous increases in asset volatility result in greater priority spreading and yields on senior and subordinated bonds converge as asset volatility increases. Received January 22, 2018; editorial decision January 27, 2019 by Editor David Denis.

Past studies document that incentive conflicts may lead issuer‐paid credit rating agencies to provide optimistically biased ratings. In this paper, we present evidence that investors question the quality of issuer‐paid ratings and raise corporate bond yields where the issuer‐paid rating is more positive than benchmark investor‐paid ratings. We also find that some firms with favorable issuer‐paid ratings substitute public bonds with borrowings from informed intermediaries to mitigate the “lemons discount” associated with poor quality ratings. Overall, our results suggest that the quality of issuer‐paid ratings has significant effects on borrowing costs and the choice of debt.