The study investigates how producer-specific environmental factors influence the performance of Irish credit unions. The empirical analysis uses a two-stage approach. The first stage measures efficiency by a data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimator, which explicitly incorporates the production of undesirable outputs such as bad loans in the modelling, and the second stage uses truncated regression to infer how various factors influence the (bias-corrected) estimated efficiency. A key finding of the analysis is that 68% of Irish credit unions do not incur an extra opportunity cost in meeting regulatory guidance on bad debt.

This study provides further empirical investigation, in the context of giant Japanese banks, of the recent claim by Pulley and Braunstein (1992, A composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking, Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 221–230), that their new composite model for the multiproduct cost function has important advantages over the separable quadratic, generalized translog and standard translog models. In addition to assessing the composite model's relative ability in measuring global scope and scale economies, the study also extends the P-B analysis to assess measurement of product-specific scope and scale economies, pairwise cost complementarities between outputs, changes in the marginal costs of outputs and technological change. The results appear to confirm P-B's chain. The persistent finding of scale economies for large Japanese banks is also investigated and confirmed.

Credit unions in the United States (US) are exempt (benefit from subsidies) from federal corporate income taxes, which are traditionally justified by their non-profit cooperative status and mission of meeting the financial needs of individuals of modest means. In recent years, the efficacy and fairness of these subsidies has been debated extensively as the traditional demarcation between banks and credit unions and their respective customer bases have blurred. To investigate how credit unions allocate subsidies to various stakeholders, we estimate a structural profit model for matched pairs of credit unions and commercial banks. We find that credit unions use most (approximately 90%) of their tax exemption for the benefit of their membership via above-market deposit interest rates.

The growth of US credit unions during the 1990s is investigated empirically, using univariate and multivariate cross sectional and panel estimation techniques. Univariate tests of the law of proportionate effect suggest that in general large credit unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts. On average credit unions with above-average growth in one period tended to experience below-average growth in the next. Smaller credit unions tended to have more variable growth than large ones. While credit unions share a common co-operative philosophy, they differ in terms of age profile, scope for membership growth, charter type and financial structure and performance. In estimations of a multivariate growth model, most of these characteristics are found to have a significant influence on the size-growth relationship. While large state chartered credit unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts, the reverse was true for federally chartered credit unions. In general, if larger credit unions grew faster than smaller ones, they tended to do so for specific reasons: because their charters were less restrictive, because they were more efficient, or because they had a financial structure that was more conducive to growth. Therefore credit union growth was not `random', but highly systematic.