T HERE is no professional consensus about the process of aggregate wage inflation. A spectrum of opinion exists between the following extreme poles: (1) That wages are determined instantaneously in markets where participants have rational expectations and can anticipate in their behavior the long-run consequences of any consistent pattern of macro policy making;' and (2) that wages are determined largely by institutional forces including considerations of equity, normal historical wage patterns, union strength, and current bargaining conditions.2 Adherents of these polar positions have little respect for wage adjustment equations of the Phillips (1958) or Phelps (1967)-Friedman (1968) variety in which wages are related structurally to aggregate unemployment rates. These adjustment equations occupy a middle ground in the spectrum and are currently used in large scale econometric models to explain how the effects of a change in demand are distributed into real and price components. Between the poles are several alternative justifications of wage-unemployment relationships. Among these are the following views: That wages are determined as in (1) above except for the existence of long-run contracts;3 that the determination of expectations about future prices can be fairly approximated by a distributed lag on past prices;4 that it is past prices rather than expectations of future prices that are important;5 and that economic conditions are but one of a set of factors to be included in the current bargaining conditions that determine wages.6 Which of these views best describes the process of wage determination is an empirical question, but the question is quite complicated and does not appear to be capable of resolution through a single, conclusive test. Many issues are involved simultaneously and no one has been able to find a set of workable assumptions that can be agreed upon by all as being a sensible way to proceed. The question of wage determination continues to divide macroeconomic opinion more than any other single issue. This paper reports results of empirical work on wage equations in which a strategy of disaggregation has been followed. It is part of a larger project to estimate the dependence of the natural rate of unemployment on the distributions of the supply and demand for labor according to location and occupation. As an estimation strategy, disaggregation can avoid problems of identification and could, in principle, provide a way to distinguish among the many competing hypotheses in this area. In practice, the disagreements are so fundamental and the possible tests so limited that the results can be offered as no more than an extension of the wage equation literature rather than as a resolution of the issue of whether wage equations should be treated as structural relations or, of even greater ambition, what those relations might be. The extension provided follows the direction of Baily and Tobin (1977, 1978) who hypothesized that the rate of wage change in a single labor force group should depend on the unemployment rate of that group and its wage relative to the wages of other groups. The results are interesting for several reasons. First, the wage data that are used in these tests come from a survey not previously used in the estimation of aggregate wage equations. The data are from the National Survey of Professional Administrative, Technical and Clerical Pay (PATC).7 This survey is conducted annually by the Bureau Received for publication September 18. 1981. Revision accepted for publication May 4, 1982. * The University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to thank Gregory Krohn and Bruce Chapman for their excellent research assistance. Helpful comments were received from Paul Gertler and the participants at a seminar at the National Commission for Employment Policy. This research was supported by Grant Number 99-0-2289-50-11 from the National Commission for Employment Policy, and Contract Number 20-06-08-11 from the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. ' See, for example, Lucas (1973) and Sargent and Wallace (1975). 2See Dunlop (1977). 3See Phelps and Taylor (1977) and Fischer (1977). 4McNees (1979) provides a way to distinguish this position from the one in the subsequent phrase. 5 See Okun (1978) for a summary of studies of this kind. 6See Hicks (1955) and (1974, pp. 59-85). Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980).

This paper derives some analytic results concerning the possible effects of a tax-based incomes policy (TIP), and compares them to the effects of a wage subsidy or a decreased payroll tax. The policies are compared using a model of firm equilibrium which is somewhat simpler than that of Yehuda Kotowitz and Richard Portes, and R. W. Latham and David Peel. Because the model is one of firm equilibrium, it ignores both interactions among firms and workers, and the bargaining process. As a result, it cannot answer all possible questions about the effectiveness of a TIP. Nevertheless, the model can address an important question that lies at the very heart of the issue of the possible effectiveness of a TIP: in what way would a TIP influence a firm to change its wage and price decisions, assuming nothing else in the economy were to be changed. If, as shown below, certain versions of TIP

Economic theory tells us that there is no single best way to treat capital gains in a definition of income. But it is necessary for practical reasons that some policy toward capital gains be adopted by institutions with endowments. This creates a dilemma which can be resolved only by a careful blend of theoretical analysis and judgment. I will attempt to clarify the roles of theory and judgment in this paper, and then to outline their implications for the income formula of the American Economic Association (AEA).

This paper incorporates land in a neoclassical model of economic growth. Saving and investment functions are modified due to the existence of land and these modifications yield some interesting results concerning the rate of capital accumulation: First, the maximum consumption path is unattainable; and second, the rate of capital accumulation depends negatively on both the equilibrium rate of growth and the relative share of land in national income. The latter result is a quantification of an effect claimed by many observers to characterize certain underdeveloped countries; namely, that saving motives are satisfied by land holdings (and the increase in real land prices) rather than by capital accumulation. Equilibrium in neoclassical growth models with two assets was first examined by James Tobin (1965). Most of the subsequent work on two asset models has continued to use Tobin's assumption that the asset other than capital is government debt and that its importance for equilibrium growth obtains solely from its role

Donald A. Nichols, Session Topic: Inflation and Stock Prices: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 31, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Dallas, Texas December 28-30, 1975 (May, 1976), pp. 483-487