The author considers trade between a flexible-wage America and a rigid-wage Europe. In a benchmark case, a move from autarky to free trade doubles European unemployment. American wages rise to the European level. Entry of the unskilled 'South' to world markets raises European unemployment. Europe's commitment to the high wage wholly insulates America from the shock. Immigration to America raises American income, but lowers European income dollar for dollar, while European unemployment rises. Absent South-North migration of the unskilled from 1970-90, Europe could have maintained the same wage with from one-eighth to one-fourth less unemployment.

Does national market size matter for industrial structure? This has been suggested by theoretical work on "home market" effects. In the present paper, I show that what previously was regarded as an assumption of convenience--transport costs only for the differentiated goods--matters a great deal. In a focal case in which differentiated and homogeneous goods have identical transport costs, the home market effect disappears. This paper discusses available evidence on the relative trade costs for differentiated and homogeneous goods. No compelling argument is found that market size will matter for industrial structure.

I consider trade between a flexible-wage America and a rigid-wage Europe. In a benchmark case, a move from autarky to free trade doubles European unemployment. American wages rise to the European level. Entry of the unskilled "South" to world markets raises European unemployment. Europe's commitment to the high wage wholly insulates America from the shock. Immigration to America raises American income, but lowers European income dollar for dollar, while European unemployment rises. Absent South-North migration of the unskilled from 1970-1990, Europe could have maintained the same wage with from one-eighth to one-fourth less unemployment.

There are two principal theories of why countries trade: comparative advantage and increasing returns to scale. Which is most important in practice? The large volume of intra‐OECD trade is frequently cited as critical evidence on this question. It is argued that comparative advantage, unlike scale economies, is incapable of accounting for the large volume of trade between seemingly similar economies. This is a theoretical claim. In this paper. I show that it is possible to give an account of this trade based on comparative advantage. The elements that may give rise to a large volume of North‐North trade are traced to identifiable features of technology and endowments.

Bilateral trade deficits are a perennial policy issue. Former Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and China, Merit Janow (1994 p. 55), notes that during the first George Bush administration, “High deficits coupled with the continuing allegations from U.S. business interests about the closed nature of the Japanese market were resulting in serious domestic political pressures for improved access to the Japanese market.” Recently Robert C. Feenstra et al. (1998 p. 1) made similar comments vis-a-vis China: “Some analysts have interpreted the large U.S.–China bilateral trade deficit as prima facie evidence of unacceptably high levels of protectionism in China, and have advocated stringent entry conditions for China’s admission into WTO.” Given the policy salience of bilateral trade deficits, it is peculiar that no one has ever examined them empirically for a broad set of countries. One reason for the scant study is that economists are naturally (and sensibly) loath to accept the terms of the policy debate, which considers bilateral trade deficits ipso facto harmful. A second reason is that economists believe there may be very natural explanations for bilateral imbalances. One such explanation finds its origins in macroeconomic identities that equate current-account deficits to an excess of investment over saving. From this, it may be argued that bilateral imbalances will arise naturally in trade between countries in aggregate surplus and those in aggregate deficit. Indeed, this is the principal explanation that the profession has given policymakers, and it forms the foundation of many U.S. bilateral trade initiatives such as the Structural Impediments Initiative and the Framework talks. Janow (1994 p. 55) observes that “there was (and is) little disagreement among economists that the causes of large aggregate and bilateral deficits are largely attributable to macroeconomic factors” [italics added]. A second account may rely on what may be termed “triangular trade,” in which cross-country differences in the patterns of demand and supply mean that a country will run bilateral deficits with those countries that are unusually important suppliers of the goods for which the deficit country happens to be an unusually strong demander. In this paper, we use the canonical “gravity model” of bilateral trade to form predictions about bilateral trade balances. We develop two key variants of the model, in which bilateral trade imbalances arise due to aggregate macroeconomic imbalances or due to “triangular trade,” and we implement these empirically for a broad set of countries. Our results paint a dismal picture. The central explanations that economists provide to explain bilateral balances perform miserably. There are two key failures. First, actual bilateral trade imbalances are much larger than those predicted; there is a “mystery of excess trade balances.” Second, even after we allow for both macroeconomic imbalances and idiosyncrasies in the structure and levels of demand and production, the models perform poorly in explaining bilateral trade balances. These failures of economists’ standard explanations of bilateral trade imbalances require that we move beyond the simple gravity framework to consider alternative explanations: homogeneous goods, highly specialized intermediates, and the role of policy.

A half century of empirical work attempting to predict the factor content of trade in goods has failed to bring theory and data into congruence. Our study shows how the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory, when modified to permit technical differences, a breakdown in factor price equalization, the existence of nontraded goods, and costs of trade, is consistent with data from ten OECD countries and a rest-of-world aggregate.

The integrated equilibrium is a paradigm that has played a central role in the field of international trade. The concept originated with Paul A. Samuelson (1949), was further developed by Avinash K. Dixit and Victor F. Norman (1980), and placed at the heart of international analysis by Elhanan Helpman and Paul R. Krugman (1985). The central idea is that a world with imperfect mobility of productive factors across regions or countries may replicate the essential equilibrium of a fully integrated economy, provided that goods are perfectly mobile. The concept of the integrated equilibrium has proved to be exceptionally tractable and useful for analytic developments, as for example in the work of Gene M. Grossman and Helpman (1992). We have found using elements of integrated equilibrium analysis useful in our own work (e.g., Davis et al., 1997). The central figures in developing the theory of trade and growth within the integrated equilibrium framework have been quite aware of its limitations. Helpman and Krugman (1985) include a section on the cases in which factor-price equalization (FPE) breaks down. Grossman and Helpman (1992) make the distinction between national and international spillovers a key element of their theory of trade and growth. Moreover, the starting point of Krugman’s work in the past decade on economic geography has been precisely to deny that the world operates as if it were an integrated economy. This notwithstanding, we believe that the grip of integrated equilibrium analysis on the way that the economics profession conceives of world trade patterns remains very powerful and in important ways distorts one’s view of trade relations, particularly among the relatively rich countries of the OECD. We do not propose to banish integrated equilibrium analysis. We believe that it is useful in the proper context. However, we do propose that it is important to have a fuller appreciation of the limits of such analysis from an empirical standpoint and thus to have a richer view of the determinants of world trade patterns.

The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model of factor service trade is a mainstay of international economics. Empirically, though, it is a flop. This warrants a new approach. We test the HOV model with international and Japanese regional data. The strict HOV model performs poorly because it cannot explain the international location of production. Restricting the sample to Japanese regions provides no help, inter alia giving rise to what Daniel Trefler calls the "mystery of the missing trade." However, when we relax the assumption of universal factor price equalization, results improve dramatically. In sum, the HOV model performs remarkably well.

Leading empiricists and theorists of cities have recently argued that the generation and exchange of ideas must play a more central role in the analysis of cities. This paper develops the first system of cities model with costly idea exchange as the agglomeration force. The model replicates a broad set of established facts about the cross section of cities. It provides the first spatial equilibrium theory of why skill premia are higher in larger cities and how variation in these premia emerges from symmetric fundamentals.

We consider the distribution of economic activity within a country in light of three leading theories—increasing returns, random growth, and locational fundamentals. To do so, we examine the distribution of regional population in Japan from the Stone Age to the modern era. We also consider the Allied bombing of Japanese cities in WWII as a shock to relative city sizes. Our results support a hybrid theory in which locational fundamentals establish the spatial pattern of relative regional densities, but increasing returns help to determine the degree of spatial differentiation. Long-run city size is robust even to large temporary shocks.