One of the most striking changes in the U.S. economy over the past 50 years has been the growth in the service sector. Between 1950 and 2000, service-sector employment grew from 57 to 75 percent of total employment. However, over this time, the real hourly wage in the service sector grew only slightly faster than in the goods sector. In this paper, we assess whether or not the essential constancy of the relative wage implies that individuals face small costs of switching sectors, and we quantify the relative importance of labor supply and demand factors in the growth of the service sector. We specify and estimate a two-sector labor market equilibrium model that allows us to address these empirical issues in a unified framework. Our estimates imply that there are large mobility costs: output in both sectors would have been double their current levels if these mobility costs had been zero. In addition, we find that demand-side factors, that is, technological change and movements in product and capital prices, were responsible for the growth of the service sector. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Since the 2000s, economists across fields have increasingly used consumer credit reporting data for research. We introduce readers to the economics and institutional details of these data. Using examples from the literature, we provide practical guidance on how to use these data to construct economic measures of borrowing, consumption, credit access, financial distress, and geographic mobility. We explain what credit scores measure and why. We highlight how researchers can access credit reporting data via existing datasets or by creating new datasets, including by linking credit reporting data with surveys and external datasets.

We study how intermediaries – mortgage servicers – shaped the implementation of mortgage forbearance during the COVID-19 pandemic and use servicer-level variation to trace out the causal effects of forbearance on borrowers. Forbearance provision varied widely across servicers. Small servicers, nonbanks, and especially nonbanks with small liquidity buffers, facilitated fewer forbearances and saw a higher incidence of forbearance-related complaints. Easier access to forbearance substantially increased mortgage nonpayment but also reduced delinquencies outside of forbearance. Part of the liquidity from forbearance was used to reduce credit card debt, but most was saved or used for nondurable consumption.