We introduce a framework for studying collective search by teams. Discoveries are correlated over time and governed by a Brownian path, where search speed is jointly controlled. Agents individually choose when to cease search and implement their best discovery. We characterize equilibrium and optimal policies. Search speeds are constant within active alliances and depend on complementarities between members. A drawdown stopping boundary governs each agent’s search termination. The consequent exit waves, whereby possibly heterogeneous agents cease search simultaneously, exhibit deterministic sequencing but stochastic timing. We highlight environments with lower than optimal equilibrium speeds and search durations, and different exit waves.

We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985, Econometrica 53, 1315–1335). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free‐rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to those documented empirically. We also uncover how private information interdependence can be a key catalyst for the mechanism studied.