I examine the timeliness of write-downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The timeliness of write-downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write-down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by exposure-specific credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that the accounting write-downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write-downs, I document that corporate governance quality, regulatory investigations, and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write-downs, whereas the write-downs by firms with higher financial leverage, tighter regulatory constraints, and more complex exposures are less timely. I control for numerous exposure-specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, I find that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write-downs.

We find that in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis banks replenished only 12% of crisis-related losses through SEOs in 2009 and 2010. However, SEOs are disproportionately conducted by Capital Purchase Program (CPP) recipients, and this is not explained by CPP recipients’ economic and regulatory capital needs. SEOs in 2009 and 2010 by CPP recipients alone account for 27% by number, and 50% by dollar amount, of all SEOs by U.S. banks between 1994 and 2010, indicating the CPP is an influential event in the history of U.S. bank SEOs during this period. Controlling for economic and regulatory capital determinants of SEOs, CPP recipients were more likely than non-recipients to have a SEO within four quarters subsequent to CPP receipt. SEO proceeds were used to repay CPP receipts without jeopardizing loan growth. Banks that received CPP funds prior to the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and banks with greater reliance on non-traditional banking activities, were more likely to have a SEO expeditiously and repay CPP funds early. Collectively, the results provide new evidence on the realized consequences of the CPP for bank SEOs. Tests suggest the CPP's indirect costs of restrictions on corporate policies and actions as the most likely explanation for the results.

This study investigates the efficacy of a fundamental analysis-based approach to screen U.S. bank stocks. We construct an index (BSCORE) based on fourteen bank–specific valuation signals. We document a positive association between BSCORE and future profitability changes, as well as current and one-year-ahead stock returns, implying that BSCORE captures forward looking information that the markets are yet to impound. A hedge strategy based on BSCORE yields positive hedge returns for all but two years during our 1994–2014 sample period. Results are robust to partitions of size, analyst following, and exchange listing, and persist after adjusting for risk factors. We further document a positive relation between BSCORE and future analyst forecast surprises as well as earnings announcement period returns, and a negative relation between BSCORE and future performance-based delistings. Overall, our results show that a fundamental analysis-based approach can provide useful insights for analyzing banks.

Using an extensive database of 356,463 sell‐side equity analysts' reports from 2002 to 2009, this study is one of the first to analyze the readability of analysts' reports. We first examine the determinants of variations in analyst report readability. Using several proxies for ability, we show that reports are more readable when issued by analysts with higher ability. Second, we test the relation between analysts' report readability and stock trading volume reactions. We find that trading volume reactions increase with the readability of analysts' text, consistent with theoretical models that predict that more precise information (and hence more informative signals) results in investors' initiating trades. These results support the view that the readability of analysts' reports is important to analysts and capital market participants.

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.

We investigate changes in the risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other nonconforming, and commercial mortgages for sponsor-originators during the recent financial crisis. Using the volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads, we observe a pronounced increase in the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations as early as 2006. Furthermore, reflecting the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that investors recognized the increased credit risk of other nonconforming and commercial mortgage securitizations as the financial crisis progressed. Additional analyses show that risk-relevance varies cross-sectionally with structural characteristics such as monoline credit-enhancement and the presence of special servicers for commercial mortgage securitizations. Our results inform the current debates on the opacity of securitization structures and highlight the need to take into account cross-sectional and inter-temporal heterogeneity in risk-relevance across securitized asset classes and securitization characteristics (e.g., quality and type of collateral and transaction structure).

The costs and benefits of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 ( SOX ) have been oft‐debated since the inception of the Act. Much of the extant literature has assessed the costs and benefits of SOX to publicly traded companies. We focus on the costs of SOX compliance for private firms wanting to exit the private market via either an acquisition by a public firm or an IPO . Consistent with our predictions we establish two principal findings. First, SOX appears to have shifted the preferences of private firms from going public to exiting the private market via acquisition by a public acquirer. Second, private target deal multiples are increasing in variables that proxy for a private target's level of pre‐acquisition SOX compliance. These findings suggest that SOX ‐related costs have both restricted the action space of possible exit strategies for private firms and led to lower deal multiples for those private acquisition targets that are less likely to be SOX compliant prior to acquisition.

Despite persistent academic and regulatory concerns, collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) have consistently demonstrated resiliency over the past two decades. We document that firms whose loans are acquired by CLOs are less likely to experience adverse credit events within 12 months of inclusion in the CLO portfolio, particularly when CLOs maintain institutional-level relationships with originating banks (through repeated transactions) or when individual-level relationships exist (as evidenced by personnel flows between originating banks and CLOs). The effects of these relationships are more pronounced when banks likely possess superior private information about borrowers. Furthermore, conditional upon filing for bankruptcy, borrowers whose loans are held by CLOs with institutional- or individual-level relationships are more likely to successfully reorganize under Chapter 11. Collectively, our findings highlight the dual information channels, both institutional and personnel based, that mitigate information frictions in the leveraged loan market. Data Availability: Data are available from commercial sources cited in the text.

Non-arm’s-length transactions between a firm and its related parties, or related-party transactions (RPTs), are widely used in emerging economies. We examine the effect of creditor rights on the usage of financing RPTs using the enactment of India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) of 2016 as a shock to creditor rights. We show that stronger creditor rights make arm’s-length external financing more attractive relative to RPT financing. In particular, we find that firms that are ex ante more likely to be affected by IBC (i.e., those with low asset tangibility) reduce their dependence on financing-related RPTs, in particular, RPT loan inflows. This effect is strengthened for firms with greater financial constraints and higher growth opportunities. Our findings suggest that creditor rights influence financing choices and contribute to our understanding of how insolvency reforms affect financing and RPTs in emerging markets.

A few highly successful firms (“superstar firms”) have captured large market shares and earned massive profits in recent decades. We examine whether superstar firms are associated with a greater likelihood of financial distress for firms exposed to them in product markets. Building on recent research, we identify superstars as firms with the highest markups in the industry and whose industry markup share increases over time. We then measure, with product similarity scores, a firm’s overall product market exposure to superstars. We document that firms with greater exposure are more likely to file for bankruptcy. We examine why superstar exposure is associated with bankruptcy and show that firms with the greater superstar exposure exhibit weaker financial performance and greater riskiness. Furthermore, we show that the association between superstar exposure and the likelihood of bankruptcy strengthens when superstars have greater market power.