At the beginning perhaps it would be appropriate to say that three assumptions have been made throughout the entire discussion. They include:1. An assumption that there are approximately 45 classroom hours available to the instructor, 2. An assumption that for many students it is the only finance course they will take, 3. An assumption that the course is oriented toward business finance, and not, for instance, capital markets, or money and banking.

Journal Article Stable Spillovers among Substitutes Get access E. C. H. Veendorp E. C. H. Veendorp Tulane University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 42, Issue 3, July 1975, Pages 445–456, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296857 Published: 01 July 1975

I. Introduction, 157. — II. Expected profits and the generalized mean, 159. — III. A comment on Siegel's analysis, 165. — IV. Expected value analysis in other areas of economics, 168.

Journal Article Incentive Pricing and Utility Regulation: A Comment Get access Thomas E. Kennedy Thomas E. Kennedy Kansas State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 89, Issue 2, May 1975, Pages 311–313, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884436 Published: 01 May 1975

There is broad consensus that three types of risk confront the potential bond purchaser: the risk of default (possible interest and/or principal loss), the risk of interest rate changes (possible principal loss or gain if the bonds are sold before maturity), and price level risk (loss of purchasing power). The analysis in this paper is directed toward the first of these risks, the risk of default. By assuming that investors require interest rate adjustments on debt subject to default sufficient to give them an expected present value equal to the present value associated with the investment of their funds in default-free securities, we examine the process that determines the risk-adjusted equilibrium interest rate and the factors affecting that rate. We also examine the implications of the model for the cost of debt and a firm's debt capacity.

This paper discusses the asymptotic behavior of the neoclassical two-sector growth model when the steady-state conditions are not fulfilled, and derives the asymptotic growth rates for cases in which Hicks neutral technical progress occurs in the investment sector, or Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at different rates in the two sectors. The last section compares the asymptotic properties of this model with the standard steady-state properties of the two-sector growth model. IN THE EIGHTEEN YEARS following the publication of Professor Solow's classic one-sector model [8], much work has been done in attempting to explain the stylized facts of growth by means of aggregate models. However, almost without exception, these models have concentrated on analyzing the properties of the steady-state equilibrium, ignoring the behavior of the economy should a steady state fail to exist. Even those models that have implicitly dealt with the singularity of the steady-state solution2 have done so by attempting to explain why the steady state should occur (for example, Kennedy [5] and Chang [4]), rather than by explaining the non-steady-state properties of their models. In this paper we shall study the behavior of a two-sector economy in which the steady-state conditions are not fulfilled. Our analysis will follow, for the most part, the technique developed by Vanek [12 and 13] and extended by Bertrand and Vanek [2]. In these papers the authors study the behavior of the aggregate capitallabor ratio in a one-sector model in which the steady-state condition is not fulfilled. However, they do not explicitly discuss the asymptotic behavior of the economy, nor do they contrast the asymptotic behavior of the non-steady-state economy to those characteristics attributed to the steady-state world. It is the purpose of this paper to examine both of these issues for a two-sector growth model.3

Much attention has been devoted to the peculiar behavior of the unemployment rate from 1969 to 1973.

The dramatic surge of the commodity option market over the past few years may well be illustrated by the growth (before its collapse) of one leading option writer, Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., whose sales rose from $1 million in 1971 to over $45 million by the end of 1972. The commodity option market is closely related to the commodity futures market, except that options are available only on the so-called “international” commodities.