In this paper, we attempt to blend economic theory with an understanding of the historical context and regulation of Japanese financial markets, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. The historical and regulatory context is critical since it represents the framework within which the economic forces operated. That is, we are interested in examining how a particular structure, characterized by controlled interest rates, segmentation of markets and functions, and limited entry, gave rise in understandable ways to distinctive corporate financial practices.

An unsettled issue in the literature relating to the relative wage effect of unions is the appropriate treatment of union status in a wage determination model. In the context of a three-equation model determining union membership and union- and nonunion-sector wage rates, this paper presents an instrumental variables (IV) procedure for estimating the parameters of the wage equations and a test of the exogeneity of union status using the Hausman specification test. An advantage of our IV procedure in comparison to the widely used inverse Mill's ratio procedure is that our procedure is a distribution-free estimator, whereas the inverse Mill's ratio estimator hinges in the assumption that the error term of the choice equation is normally distributed. Using data for a sample of middle-aged white workers, we estimate the parameters of the union and nonunion wage equations with both procedures. On the key question of the endogeneity of union status, the Hausman test decisively rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity. The inverse Mill's ratio procedure, in contrast, provides coefficient estimates on the selectivity terms that fail to indicate evidence of sample selectivity in either sector.

The information content of Value Line Investment Survey rank changes is investigated. The results suggest rank changes affect common stock prices, but the effect varies by the type of rank change. Changes from rank 2 to rank 1 have the most dramatic impact on prices. A cross-sectional analysis finds small firms have a greater reaction to a rank change than larger firms, which supports theories on the frequency of report arrival and precision of information. A speed of adjustment test concludes the prices of individual securities adjust to the information in a rank change over a multiple-day period.

The exchange rate is recognised as a particularly tricky subject for modelling and prediction. The problems of unobservables such as expectations, of simultaneity, and of policy changes (both overt and covert) in the sample period to which models must be fitted may account for the disappointing results of recent attempts to test theories of exchange rate determination. This paper develops an appropriate empirical model to deal with these problems; it allows consideration of the proper interpretation of theoretical assumptions and determination of how far modelling for ex ante prediction can succeed.

In a recent paper in this Journal, Gaumnitz et al. [1982] provided evidence on the consensus of auditors' judgments which seemed to reconcile conflicting results reported in Ashton [1974] and Joyce [1976]. In their study Gaumnitz et al. [1982] combined judgment tasks of evaluating internal control and recommending the number of audit hours needed to assess the propriety and collectibility of accounts receivable. They reported mean correlations of 0.704 and 0.617 for internal control and audit planning judgments, respectively. The former was consistent with Ashton [1974] and the latter was higher than observed by Joyce [1976], who reported a mean correlation of only .373 for audit hour of an accounts receivable subsystem. Gaumnitz et al. suggested that by linking the two judgment tasks they reinforced the link between internal control and planned number of audit hours. Specifically, they stated: link is provided by the auditor's knowledge that an inverse relationship should exist between the strength of internal control and the number of audit hours planned. Thus, the requirement to provide an explicit judgment on the strength of internal control enabled our subjects to operationalize this inverse relationship, resulting in a high correlation (relative to Joyce's findings) among audit hour estimates [1982, pp. 753]. This explanation appears plausible given the results of previous audit judgment research. That is, high levels of consensus have been found for

A multiperiod, general equilibrium model of the labor market is developed in which risk-averse workers are faced with job-related uncertainty and labor turnover is costly. If a worker is unlucky and suffers a bad job match, he quits and joins another firm, hoping that he will like its work environment more. Because the quality of a job match is unobservable, workers cannot insure against the risk of a bad match. The firm provides implicit insurance against job dissatisfaction, typically by paying workers more than their net marginal products in their early years with the firm and less subsequently. Since the probabilities of the insured-against events (the quit rates over time) are affected by the amount of such insurance provided, this implicit insurance is characterized by moral hazard. Individuals quit when in the absence of insurance they would not. The equilibrium contract balances out efficiency in risk bearing with efficiency in turnover incentives. We show that the equilibrium contract is not (constrained) efficient and indicate why.

In Britain, female labor force participation rose steadily from the Second World War to 1977. To explain this, we estimate a pooled time-series, cross-section supply function for single-year age groups of women. The life-cycle pattern is explained quite well by the presence of children. At a second stage we try to explain the rising level of the cohort intercepts estimated at the first stage. Real wage growth may be an explanatory factor, as cross-section evidence suggests it should be. Finally, we point to the 15% rise in the relative pay of women in the mid-1970s caused by the Equal Pay Act. This did not cause the expected decline in the relative demand for female employees.