I. Introduction, 567. — II. The consumption use of savings, 569. — The commercial use, 573. — The production use, 575. — III. The yield schedules: scarcity-reducing investments, 578; — efficiency-increasing investments, 583. — Currency difficulties, 586. — IV. The combined schedule, 590. — Sale of rent bearers, 592. — Equalization of rates, 593. — "Productivity" 594. — V. The influence of interest on saving, 596. — Saving and other factors, 601. — VI. Conclusion, 603.
The problem stated and limited, 63. — The result when sellers consider only their direct influence upon price and adjust amounts (Cournot), 66. — The same when prices are adjusted (Bertrand, Marshall, Pareto, Edgeworth, Pigou), 69. — The result when sellers consider their total influence upon price, 83. — The factor of uncertainty as to what the other seller will do, 87. — The effects of '#|201C;friction,” 89. — Summary, 91. Mathematical Appendix, 93. — Cournot, 93. — Pareto, 95. — Amoroso, 97. — Evans, 97> — Bowley, 98.
The Review of Economics and Statistics192911(4), 197
W E are familiar with the grow-th of the volNIAurume of spec-ulation in recent years, the growth of brokers' loans, the gradual rise of interest rates, the attempt of the Reserve banks and Imember banks to check the absorption of credit, the successful appeal of the market for funds from outside the banks, and the increasing pressure of this dernand upon all the money markets of the world. We have noted also the resulting movemnent of gold to the United States $200,000,000 in the first nine months of this year; the action of Canada and Argentina, establishing embargoes upon the export of gold from those countries to the United States, although such action meant a partial abandonment of the gold standard; the a] arm in Europe over the rising value of gold; the general advance of discount rates in Europe, and finally the action of the Bank of England in raising its discount rate to the alarming figure of 61/ per cent, followed by the rapid withdrawal of European funds from New York, and the dramatic collapse of the stock market, with a shrinkage of $2,500,000,000 in stock exchange loans. An astonishing amount of reputable support was given to such ideas as that the Reserve authorities were paying too much attention to the market, that they had no supervisory powers over stock prices or brokers' loans, and that in defending their own reserves they were culpably making money tight. If the reserves had not thus been defended, what reason is there for thinking that they would not have been completely drawn into use, before the uttermost ends of the earth were ransacked. It is surprising that so many people should have forgotten the experience of the Reserve system in the crisis of I920-2I. The Reserve banks were forbidden to make loans for the purpose of buying stocks, bonds or other investment securities, excepting United States Government bonds. Under this exception they became the principal agency of the Treasury in financing its needs during the war, and when the war ended they were loaded to the guards with rediscounts secured by Liberty Bonds. Then came the great deflation of prices and credits, which was followed by a storm of criticism of the Reserve banks for their failure to render in that crisis the assistance that was expected of them. But how could they assist anybody? They were in the situation up to their necks themselves. The strength of a Reserve bank is in its reserves, and these institutions had no reserves. They were in the same condition as the other banks that were looking to them for help. They had nothing to put into the situation, but were under the necessity of collecting some of their outstanding credits before they could grant new ones. In view of this experience, so comparatively recent, what possible defence would have been available to the Reserve authorities if they had allowed Reserve credit to become an important factor in the increase of brokers' loans from $3,000,000,ooo to $8,500,000,000 in the last two and one half years, and how much worse might the situation have been in the last week of October if it had been known that the Reserve banks already had made use of their reserves? But while the case for the restrictive Reserve policy thus seems perfectly clear, nevertheless certain objections were raised which are entitled to further consideration. Membership in the World Association of Gold Standard Nations, although an informal relationship, implies certain mutual obligations. The monetary systems of all the member nations, their credit structures, the wage and price systems, the relations between debtors and creditors in short, all of the complicated relations of modern, highly organized, society are dependent upon the common gold basis. It is not an absolutely firm and immovable basis for any of them. In a sense it is a liquid basis, a movable, shifting basis. Gold distributes itself around the world in response to the demands for it, and under normal conditions it may be assumed that each country will get the share which corresponds to its participation in trade and will best maintain stability not only in international value relationships but in domestic value relationships as well. On the other hand, irregular and abnormal conditions anywhere affecting the international movements of gold may disturb the sensitive equilibrium
The Review of Economics and Statistics192911(1), 44
AT ninth annual conference of Harvard Committee on Economic Research held a year ago, it was pointed out by present writer that oil industry had been passing through era of unprecedented and even revolutionary advances in technology without corresponding progress in art of economic and conclusion was advanced that the petroleum industry in 1928 faces and will attempt to solve its greatest problem issue of economic The year of I928 has been characterized by two outstanding features: first, progress toward economic control within industry, which has taken form of partial rationalization of crude oil production in United States and of a trend toward cartelization abroad; and, second, a betterment in statistical position and price of gasoline, resulting in favorable profits for manufacturers and distributors of that commodity. The first development was outgrowth of necessity, and was brought about by planned control on part of industry, aided by state and federal authorities. The second development was primarily resultant of natural economic forces, though regarded in many quarters as also an outgrowth of control. These two developments should be plainly distinguished if a clear perception of current status of petroleum situation is to be gained. Nineteen hundred and twenty-eight was entered on a low and unprofitable price level, with a potential crude oil supply in sight that, if left to a normal development, would have greatly exceeded physical ability of industry to cope with output. In consequence, it became necessary to stem impending flood of oil, and steps were taken in menacing flush fields of Texas, Oklahoma, and California to retard production by cooperative methods of proration and drilling shut-downs. These efforts were initiated by operators themselves, but were subsequently stabilized by invoking authority of states involved through jurisdiction of Commissions charged with responsibility of conservation and prevention of waste. In this manner. rate of outDut of prolific pools of Permian Salt Basin in West Texas was curtailed to a small fraction of potentiality; drilling up of several pools in Seminole District in Oklahoma was staggered and spread out over year; and some production was shut-in in California. As a result, crude oil production was maintained at about 2,400,000 barrels per day for first 8 months of year and around 2,500,000 barrels per day since August, thus permitting demand to catch up with supply and bringing about statistical equilibrium. These results were not obtained without great effort and there were many set-backs and numerous local situations where efforts at control failed. Yet, by and large, it was demonstrated that at low prices crude oil supply could be regulated within certain limits. Coincident with these efforts to rationalize crude oil production in United States, progress in direction of improved economic control was witnessed in other directions, particularly in appearance of a trend toward cartelization of a group of foreign oil companies, organization of plans for formation of an American Export Association for cooperative handling of petroleum export business, and improvement in domestic trade practices in distribution of gasoline. Yet, in main, it was not from achievements in artificial economic control, as important as they seem, that financial betterment in I928 came to industry, but from an entirely different source operation of natural economic law in field of gasoline manufacture. Under influence of very low prices that prevailed for gasoline from early months of I927 until spring of I928, output of gasoline was curtailed and held at relatively low levels and, what is even more important, work on refinery expansion and cracking installations came almost to a standstill; and accordingly I928 gasoline season was entered with gasoline in a strong statistical position. This condition is indicated by fact that last March gasoline stocks were 23 per cent lower than twelve months previously and 79 per cent of co mputed normal,
Abstract In this article the author discusses the accounting practices in Italy. According to the author accounting is an application of economics, it does not mean that all university accounting department should be headed by economists. Most textbooks on accounting are written under the assumption that the economics has been the same, is now the same, and will be the same. Cash in bank in Italy necessarily means a whole set of contractual relations between the depositor and the bank. So it does in the United States, but in the United States they have assumed that cash in bank - means certain fundamental. A contractual relation between a depositor and a bank, at least in America, perhaps in England, is a definite contract between two free and independent citizens or persons under law enforceable in a free and open court of justice. The America banker has almost invariably loaned money to a corporation incorporated under the laws of Bavaria or under the laws of Italy or of Brazil subject to those laws and subject to those sovereign jurisprudence principle to be adjudicated by the courts in Germany or Italy or Brazil, payable perhaps in American dollar at an American fiscal agency, but, nevertheless, a clean-cut direct participation in the sovereignty where the money is used.