This paper considers the role of an agent choosing among reporting alternatives when that choice is unobserved by the principal, and the agent's compensation contract is optimal. The agent is allowed to take post-outcome costly actions which lead to more precise reports of actual profits than would be yielded by less precise, but costless conventional translations of outcomes (e.g., GAAP). The extent to which the principal allows the agent this discretion depends upon the improvement in profits as an indicator of the agent's pre-outcome effort when post-outcome actions take place versus the attendant cost of these actions.

Daily returns are used to investigate the effect of preferred stock rating change announcements on preferred and common stock prices. Announcements that are free of confounding events, ‘clean’ announcements, significantly affect preferred stock prices. However, the effect occurs after the day of announcement, mostly on event day +1. Conversely, there is no evidence ‘clean’ announcements affect common stock prices. Larger preferred stock abnormal returns are associated with announcements that are contaminated by confounding events, but the abnormal returns appear to be the result of the confounding events more than the rating change.

Firm size, Excess returns, LIFO adoption, Tax savings

With data from the Employment Opportunities Pilot Programs (EOPP) Employers' Survey, this paper uses a continuous-time hazard model to analyze male and female job-quitting behavior. The EOPP sample is composed of recently hired workers with, at most, 2.5 years of tenure with the firm. Within this early stage of tenure, it is found that the probability of quitting declines with tenure for males and increases with tenure for females. This result leads to the conclusion that the job-matching process operates differently for females than it does for males.

Stephan E. Sefcik, Rex Thompson, An Approach to Statistical Inference in Cross-Sectional Models with Security Abnormal Returns As Dependent Variable, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 316-334

Robert E. Hoskin, John S. Hughes, William E. Ricks, Evidence on the Incremental Information Content of Additional Firm Disclosures Made Concurrently with Earnings, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24, Studies on Alternative Measures of Accounting Income (1986), pp. 1-32

Abstract. Following a five year moratorium on adoption of interest capitalization by the SEC, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued SFAS No. 34 mandating that firms previously writing off interest charges related to the construction of assets change to capitalizing those charges. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of this change in terms of the security market's reactions both to policy announcements leading up to the promulgation of SFAS No. 34, and to earnings announcements following implementation by affected companies. Significant average market reactions are indicated for two of ten policy announcements before the effects of firm size are considered; however, significance disappears when those effects are removed from excess returns. Although a bias is detected in the forecasts of analysts consistent with less than full revision to include the earnings impact, there is little evidence of market reactions to announcements of those earnings. Résumé. Après un moratoire de cinq ans sur l'adoption de la capitalisation de l'intérêt par la S.E.C., le Financial Accounting Standards Board a émis le bulletin numéro 34 qui demande aux entreprises qui passaient aux dépenses les charges d'intérêts reliées à la construction d'actifs, de les capitaliser. L'objectif de cette étude, est d'analyser l'impact de ce changement (en termes des réactions du marché des valeurs) aux annonces de politiques qui ont conduit à la promulgation du bulletin 34 et aux annonces de bénéfices qui ont suivi l'implantation pour les compagnies touchées. Les réactions du marché en moyenne sont significatives pour deux des dix annonces de politiques, avant de prendre en considération les effets de l'ampleur de la firme; cependant, ce n'est plus significatif lorsque ces effets sont retranchés des rendements excédentaires. Quoiqu'un biais soit détecté dans les prévisions des analystes, en accord avec une révision moins que complète pour inclure l'impact des bénéfices, il y a peu d'évidence des réactions du marché aux annonces de ces bénéfices.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the nonunion wage differential consists of two effects. The first represents the differential between the wage of a nonunion worker in a collective bargaining unit and the wage paid to a comparable worker not covered by a bargaining agreement. This effect arises from the monopoly power of organized labor. The second is the wage differential between union and nonunion workers in collective bargaining units. This latter effect is attributed to economic benefits that unionism brings to its members. Empirical evidence is presented in support of both effects.

Journal Article Betting and Equilibrium Get access Richard E. Quandt Richard E. Quandt Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 101, Issue 1, February 1986, Pages 201–207, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884650 Published: 01 February 1986