This paper examines multiple-bidder corporate control contests involving white knights, who are late-entry collaborative bidders. We employ auction theory to structure the analysis and examine the valuation consequences for bidding firms. An immediate white knight response to a hostile bid is met with a strong, negative market reaction. When the white knight and hostile bidder get into a ‘bidding war’ with follow-up bids by each, the white knight (but not the hostile bidder) loses each time it bids. However, if the white knight bid follows two consecutive, hostile bids and the contest ends, there are minimal losses to the white knight, which are statistically indistinguishable from the mildly positive reaction to the preceding hostile bids.

Stanley Baiman, Robert E. Verrecchia, The Relation Among Capital Markets, Financial Disclosure, Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), pp. 1-22

Recent studies argue that implicit collusion explains the tendency of Nasdaq market makers to avoid odd-eighth price quotes. This paper focuses on the role that preference trading plays in determining quoted spreads. Under the postulated effects of preference trading, an analysis of the relation between spreads and price fractions explains the paucity of odd-eighth quotes on Nasdaq. Empirical results from a comprehensive data set show that exogenous economic characteristics explain the distribution of price fractions across securities, and illustrate the stability of that distribution over time. These results contradict empirical results offered as support for the collusion hypothesis.

Short-window earnings response coefficients estimated from pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions are systematically smaller than corresponding averages of firm-specific coefficients estimated from time-series regressions. The cause is a negative relation between firm-specific earnings response coefficients and unexpected earnings variances. If the hypotheses of equality of firm-specific coefficients and equality of firm-specific unexpected earnings variances are rejected, firm-specific estimation should be used instead of pooled estimation. Using pooled estimation may lead to incorrect inferences about the magnitude of estimated coefficients and/or incorrect inferences about differences in coefficient behavior between groups of firms.

This paper examines the relation between commodity futures trading and the real side contracting behavior of firms dealing in the commodity. I argue that futures serve as a flexible form of physical contracting and should be examined in the context of the firm's contracting activities, and not strictly in the context of its financial activities. Data from an oil refining company are used to empirically study this relation. The results are consistent with a contracting view of futures use and appear inconsistent with implications of hedging theories.

Financial reporting, Hybrid financial instruments, Balance sheet classification, Accounting classification

Mark E. Peecher, The Influence of Auditors' Justification Processes on Their Decisions: A Cognitive Model and Experimental Evidence, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), pp. 125-140

Using a sample of LIFO users, we examine the strengths and weaknesses of adopting a simultaneous equations approach to study managers' adjustments of interacting accounting measures that meet multiple objectives. We focus on the importance of considering differences in the costs and the effectiveness of adjusting accounting measures. In addition, we examine managers' objectives in subsequent years and how adjustments' reversals affect those objectives. Although generally consistent with earlier studies of LIFO inventory adjustments, our results indicate that modelling interacting accounting measures, such as other current accruals and depreciation, leads to differing conclusions about the role of taxes.

Many econometric testing problems involve nuisance parameters which are not identified under the null hypotheses. This paper studies the asymptotic distribution theory for such tests. The asymptotic distributions of standard test statistics are described as functionals of chi-square processes. In general, the distributions depend upon a large number of unknown parameters. We show that a transformation based upon a conditional probability measure yields an asymptotic distribution free of nuisance parameters, and we show that this transformation can be easily approximated via simulation. The theory is applied to threshold models, with special attention given to the so-called self-exciting threshold autoregressive model. Monte Carlo methods are used to assess the finite sample distributions. The tests are applied to U.S. GNP growth rates, and we find that Potter's (1995) threshold effect in this series can be possibly explained by sampling variation.

We use unique data to analyze employer tax compliance with Unemployment Insurance (UI) provisions. The data indicate that employers may have underreported $728 million of UI taxes nationally in 1987 alone. To formally examine this noncompliance, a theoretical model of payroll tax evasion is developed showing that increasing payroll tax rates, among other things, likely increases noncompliance by risk-neutral firms. This prediction is empirically verified. The finding that UI tax evasion is systematically related to various firm characteristics suggests that UI audits may be effectively targeted by statistical profiles derived from our model, thereby improving compliance.