This paper examines the impact of the borrower–lender relationship on the explicit loan interest rate and collateral, as well as the correlation between loan interest rates and collateral. Using a simultaneous equation approach, we find that collateral has a statistically significant positive impact of 200 to 400 basis points on loan interest rates. We find this positive association to be stronger for personal (or outside) collateral than collateral provided by the firm's assets (or inside collateral). Finally, we find the economic impact of the borrower–lender relationship to be 21 basis points for one standard deviation increase in relationship length.

Technology has dramatically reduced the cost of disclosing information to investors and created new conduits for securities' sales. The result is stock ownership, both direct and indirect, has never been more widely distributed. Equally important, changes have occurred in the institutional market for new offerings. Bought deals, Internet road shows, the preeminence of mutual funds and pension funds, and foreign investors and issuers have changed the market. In the wake of these changes, the SEC's disclosure policy has evolved. The evidence suggests we have moved from a world where information was released relatively infrequently and with significant lags to a world where information is released relatively rapidly on a continuous basis to as many investors as possible.

Between 1996 and 2003, the Peruvian government issued property titles to over 1.2 million urban households, the largest titling program targeted at urban squatters in the developing world. This paper examines the labor market effects of increases in tenure security resulting from the program. To isolate the causal role of ownership rights, I make use of differences across regions induced by the timing ofthe program and differences across target populations in level of preprogram ownership rights. My estimates suggest that titling results in a substantial increase in labor hours, a shift in labor supply away from work at home to work in the outside market, and substitution of adult for child labor.

Geography, flat or not, creates special relationships between buyers and sellers who reside in the same neighborhoods, but Friedman turns this metaphor inside-out by using The World is Flat to warn us of the perils of a relationship-free world in which every economic transaction is contested globally. In his “flat” world, your wages are set in Shanghai. In fact, most of the footloose relationship-free jobs in apparel and footwear and consumer electronics departed the United States several decades ago, and few U.S. workers today feel the force of Chinese and Indian competition, notwithstanding the alarming anecdotes about the outsourcing of intellectual services. Of course, standardization, mechanization, and computerization all work to increase the number of footloose tasks, but innovation and education work in the opposite direction, creating relationship-based activities—like the writing of this review. It may only be personal conceit, but I imagine there is a reason why the Journal of Economic Literature asked me to do this review.

This paper considers the problem of selection of weights for averaging across leastsquares estimates obtained from a set of models. Existing model average methods are based on exponential AIC and BIC weights. In distinction, this paper proposes selecting the weights by minimizing a Mallows ’ criterion, the latter an estimate of the average squared error from the model average fit. We show that our new Mallows ’ Model Average (MMA) estimator is asymptotically optimal in the sense of achieving the lowest possible squared error in a class of discrete model average estimators. In a simulation experiment we show that the MMA estimator compares favorably with those based on AIC and BIC weights. The proof of the main result is an application of Li (1987). Research supported by the National Science Foundation. I gratefully thank the Co-Editor (Whitney Newey), three referees, and Benedickt Potscher for helpful comments.

Analyses of the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections. We sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the likely winner during election day. Analyzing high frequency financial fluctuations following the release of flawed exit poll data on election day 2004, and then during the vote count we find that markets anticipated higher equity prices, interest rates and oil prices, and a stronger dollar under a George W. Bush presidency than under John Kerry. A similar Republican-Democrat differential was also observed for the 2000 BushGore contest. Prediction market based analyses of all presidential elections since 1880 also reveal a similar pattern of partisan impacts, suggesting that electing a Republican president raises equity valuations by 2–3 percent, and that since Ronald Reagan, Republican presidents have tended to raise bond yields.

This paper describes an analytically tractable model of balanced growth that is consistent with the observed size distribution of Þrms. Growth is the result of idiosyncratic Þrm productivity improvements, selection of successful Þrms, and imitation by entrants. Selection tends to improve aggregate productivity at a fast rate if entry and imitation are easy. The empirical phenomenon of Zipfs law can be interpreted to mean that entry costs are high or that imitation is difficult, or both. The small size of entrants indicates that imitation must be difficult. A calibration based on U.S. data suggests that about half of output growth can be attributed to selection. But the implied variance of the combined preference and technology shocks is puzzlingly high. ∗The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. I thank Michele Boldrin, Jonathan Eaton, Xavier

We endogenize preferences using the “indirect evolutionary approach”. Individuals are randomly matched to play a two-person game. Individual (subjective) preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual (objective) pay-offs that determine fitness. Matched individuals may observe the opponents' preferences perfectly, not at all, or with some in-between probability. When preferences are observable, a stable outcome must be efficient. When they are not observable, a stable outcome must be a Nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable. We show that, for pure-strategy outcomes, these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect, and almost no, observability, with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability (despite being stable with no observability).