There are numerous aspects concerning financial regulation which the current financial turmoil has high-lighted. These include: (1) the form of deposit insurance; (2) bank solvency regimes, ‘prompt corrective action’; (3) Central Banks’ money market operations; (4) commercial bank liquidity risk management; (5) procyclicality of CARs (and mark-to-market); lack of counter-cyclical instruments; (5) boundaries of regulation, conduits, SIVs and reputational risk; (6) crisis management: (a) within countries, e.g. UK Tripartite Committee; or (b) cross-border, how to allocate the burden of cross-border defaults? This paper describes how the crisis exposed regulatory failings, drawing largely on UK experience, and suggests remedies.

Despite the extensive literature on prediction of banking crises by Early Warning Systems (EWSs), their practical use by policy makers is limited, even in the international financial institutions. This is a paradox since the changing nature of banking risks as more economies liberalise and develop their financial systems, as well as ongoing innovation, makes the use of EWS for informing policies aimed at preventing crises more necessary than ever. In this context, we assess the logit and signal extraction EWS for banking crises on a comprehensive common dataset. We suggest that logit is the most appropriate approach for global EWS and signal extraction for country-specific EWS. Furthermore, it is important to consider the policy maker's objectives when designing predictive models and setting related thresholds since there is a sharp trade-off between correctly calling crises and false alarms.

Abstract Firms can grow through internal investment or through acquisition. While internal growth takes time, an acquisition provides cash flows immediately. The opportunity to grow internally affects the price of an acquisition as it is a fall-back option for the acquirer should negotiations break down. Assuming investors do not have full information about the time a firm requires to grow internally, acquirers earn positive returns before the announcement of an acquisition, and there are negative stock price reactions to acquisition announcements. This research provides predictions about how pre-announcement price run-up and negative announcement returns relate to integration costs and synergies from acquisition.

In a recent and influential empirical paper, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (FLOS) [2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 295–327] conclude that accruals quality (AQ) is a priced risk factor. We explain that FLOS’ regressions examining a contemporaneous relation between excess returns and factor returns do not test the hypothesis that AQ is a priced risk factor. We conduct appropriate asset-pricing tests for determining whether a potential risk factor explains expected returns, and find no evidence that AQ is a priced risk factor.

Screening potential investments involves dividing a set of companies into those that are suitable to consider for investment and those that are less desirable (Kinder 2005). In this paper, I document that nonprofessional investors (represented by MBA students) are susceptible to scale compatibility effects when implementing an investment screen using non-financial measures. Such effects occur when investors rely more on a scale compatible non-financial measure whose values directly map into investors' judgments than on an equally relevant but scale incompatible measure whose values do not map into their judgments. Results from an experiment indicate that investors reduce their susceptibility to scale compatibility effects when they simultaneously screen several companies for potential investment. Because screening investments involves screening several companies, simultaneous screening represents an efficient mechanism to de-bias scale compatibility effects.

Using a monthly data set on the foreign equity and bond portfolios of U.S. investors and the U.S. equity and bond portfolios of foreign investors, we find that the returns differential for portfolio securities is far smaller than previously reported. Examining all U.S. claims and liabilities, we find that previous estimates of large differentials are biased upward. The bias owes to computing implied returns from an internally inconsistent data set of revised data; original data produce a much smaller differential. We also attempt to reconcile our findings with observed patterns of cumulated current account deficits, the net international investment position, and the net income balance. Overall, we find no evidence that the United States can count on earning substantially more on its claims than it pays on its liabilities.