In our model, financial firms’ leverage choices and asset sales impose negative externalities on other financial firms. This means that individual firms cannot determine their optimal capitalizations in isolation, but have to take the aggregate financial sector characteristics into account. In particular, they become more aggressive when their peers are more conservative. Furthermore, financial firms over-consume liquidity in equilibrium. For some parameter regions, small parameter changes can induce large differences in the equilibrium allocation of risk. Historical experience is not necessarily a good guide as to whether the prevailing equilibrium is fragile or not.

Abstract Remuneration systems in the banking industry, in particular bonus payments, have frequently been blamed for contributing to the buildup of risks leading to the recent financial crisis. In our model, banks compete for managerial talent that is private information. Competition for talent sets incentives to offer bonuses inducing risk-taking that is excessive not only from society’s perspective but also from the viewpoint of the banks themselves. In fact, bonus payments and excessive risk-taking are increasing with competition. Thus, our model offers a rationale why bonuses are paid even when reducing the expected profits of banks.

We take cohorts of entering freshmen at the United States Air Force Academy and assign half to peer groups designed to maximize the academic performance of the lowest ability students. Our assignment algorithm uses nonlinear peer effects estimates from the historical pre-treatment data, in which students were randomly assigned to peer groups. We find a negative and significant treatment effect for the students we intended to help. We provide evidence that within our “optimally” designed peer groups, students avoided the peers with whom we intended them to interact and instead formed more homogeneous subgroups. These results illustrate how policies that manipulate peer groups for a desired social outcome can be confounded by changes in the endogenous patterns of social interactions within the group.

Does the ability of suppliers of corporate debt capital to hedge risk through credit default swap (CDS) contracts impact firms' capital structures? We find that firms with traded CDS contracts on their debt are able to maintain higher leverage ratios and longer debt maturities. This is especially true during periods in which credit constraints become binding, as would be expected if the ability to hedge helps alleviate frictions on the supply side of credit markets. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

[Does the ability of suppliers of corporate debt capital to hedge risk through credit default swap (CDS) contracts impact firms' capital structures? We find that firms with traded CDS contracts on their debt are able to maintain higher leverage ratios and longer debt maturities. This is especially true during periods in which credit constraints become binding, as would be expected if the ability to hedge helps alleviate frictions on the supply side of credit markets.]

Against the background of the acknowledged importance of off-balance-sheet exposures in the sub prime crisis, we seek to investigate whether this was a new phenomenon or common to earlier crises. Using a logit approach to predicting banking crises in 14 OECD countries we find a significant impact of a proxy for the ratio of banks’ off-balance-sheet activity to total (off and on balance sheet) activity, as well as capital and liquidity ratios, the current account balance and GDP growth. These results are robust to the exclusion of the most crisis prone countries in our model. For early warning purposes we show that real house price growth is a good proxy for off balance sheet activity prior to the sub-prime episode. Variables capturing off-balance sheet activity have been neglected in most early warning models to date. We consider it essential that regulators take into account the results for crisis prediction in regulating banks and their off-balance sheet exposures, and thus controlling their contribution to systemic risk.

We discuss “Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes in Enforcement” by Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (CHL, in this issue). We begin by discussing CHL in the context of prior literature, and subsequently discuss the research design, results, and inferences. CHL seeks to contribute to the literature by disentangling the liquidity benefits of changes in accounting standards from those of changes in enforcement. Taken at face value, we believe that the evidence in CHL suggests that both change in enforcement and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) confer liquidity benefits. The largest benefits obtain when the change to IFRS reporting is combined with change in enforcement. This is not to say that enforcement conveys capital market benefits but IFRS reporting does not, or that IFRS reporting conveys capital market benefits but enforcement does not; both are necessary to confer capital market benefits.

Abstract I study the effects of overvalued equity on acquisition activity and shareholder wealth, using managers’ insider trades to measure overvaluation. I find that overvalued equity drives managers to make stock acquisitions, and such acquisitions destroy value for acquirer shareholders. Overvalued stock acquirers earn negative and lower returns in the short run and substantially underperform similarly overvalued nonacquirer firms in the long run. My results do not support the idea that managers can benefit shareholders by converting overvalued equity into real assets through stock acquisitions.

We develop a tractable model of realization utility that studies the role of reference-dependent S-shaped preferences in a dynamic investment setting with reinvestment. Our model generates both voluntarily realized gains and losses. It makes specific predictions about the volume of gains and losses, the holding periods, and the sizes of both realized and paper gains and losses that can be calibrated to a variety of statistics, including Odean's measure of the disposition effect. Our model also predicts several anomalies, including, among others, the flattening of the capital market line and a negative price for idiosyncratic risk.