In addition to being a function of traditional fundamentals such as cash-flow persistence and the discount rate, the equilibrium association between a security price and a value-relevant statistic can simply be a function of what rational investors believe the association will be. We refer to this phenomenon as beliefs-driven price association (BPA). By explicitly considering the phenomenon of BPA, we show that the price response to information releases can vary over time even if the risk-free interest rate and investor preferences are static and the earnings/cash flow generating process is stable. This observation suggests, for example, that price-to-earnings associations and price volatility can vary over time even if a stable pattern of economic fundamentals suggests otherwise. The possibility of BPA suggests that measures of the cost of capital, information content, and growth prospects inferred from observed market prices will be confounded. While we do not predict when periods of BPA will arise, we provide empirically testable predictions about how prices should behave during periods of BPA. In particular, we predict that, during sufficiently long periods of high (positive or negative) BPA, price volatility, price levels, and expected returns will be higher than would be implied by a fundamental valuation framework. Finally, while BPA in the pricing of one security does not cause BPA in the pricing of other securities, the price levels of those other securities will be affected if the securities with BPA are sufficiently large relative to the market as a whole.

Abstract In this paper, I examine the relation between disclosure commitment and cost of equity capital using accelerated earnings announcement disclosures as a measure of commitment. In settings characterized by imperfect market competition, I find that firms which consistently disclose balance sheet detail in relatively timely earnings announcements have lower costs of capital compared to other firms. This result is statistically significant and economically meaningful, and is robust to various alternative measurements for cost of capital, and alternative designs addressing endogeneity and underlying information quality. Overall, this result is important because it highlights additional dimensions of disclosure commitment (consistency and timeliness), while incorporating important features from theoretical models (information quality and market competition). In particular, my results suggest that consistency and timeliness are salient features of firms' disclosure behavior that have predictable and robust relations with capital market outcomes. This result is robust to controlling for underlying information quality; however, consistent with theory, it is conditional on low levels of market competition.

Abstract Why is the mere announcement of an open-market share repurchase program, which involves no commitment to purchase shares, regarded as good news by the market? We develop a theoretical model to resolve this puzzle. The model predicts that firms with large underpricing can attract attention from speculators by announcing repurchases, and the subsequent trades from these speculators lead to value corrections. Firms with small underpricing, however, cannot attract attention by announcing repurchases, and these firms have to use costly share repurchases as a value-correcting signal. We then provide empirical evidence corroborating the predictions of the theoretical model.

We document that CRSP and Thomson contain many voluntarily reported mutual fund portfolios that are not in SEC filings while, additionally, CRSP and Thomson are missing many SEC mandated portfolios available in SEC filings. We document that the voluntary disclosures are likely driven by convenience rather than duplicity. Although mandated portfolios contain securities with more return momentum, we find use of SEC or Thomson data lead to similar empirical findings. CRSP, however, contains inaccurate position information prior to 2008. Our findings have important implications, such as highlighting a 35% increase in observed manager trading by combining data sources.

We show that healthcare providers face a tradeoff between increasing the number of patients they treat and improving their quality of care. To measure the magnitude of this quality-quantity tradeoff, we estimate a model of dialysis provision that explicitly incorporates a centre’s unobservable and endogenous choice of treatment quality while allowing for unobserved differences in productivity across centres. We find that a centre that reduces its quality standards such that its expected rate of septic infections increases by 1 percentage point can increase its patient load by 1.6%, holding productivity, capital, and labour fixed; this corresponds to an elasticity of quantity with respect to quality of -0.2. Notably, our approach provides estimates of productivity that control for differences in quality, whereas traditional methods would misattribute lower-quality care to greater productivity.

Abstract We use an arbitrage-free term structure model with spanned stochastic volatility to determine the value of the deflation protection option embedded in Treasury inflation-protected securities. The model accurately prices the deflation protection option prior to the financial crisis when its value was near zero; at the peak of the crisis in late 2008 when deflationary concerns spiked sharply; and in the post-crisis period. During 2009, the average value of this option at the 5-year maturity was 41 basis points on a par-yield basis. The option value is shown to be closely linked to overall market uncertainty as measured by the VIX, especially during and after the 2008 financial crisis.

I use a sample of closed-end funds to examine how takeover defenses impact shareholder value and promote managerial entrenchment. These funds use the same defenses as general corporations but provide an ideal, homogeneous environment for testing their effects. Defenses are associated with lower fund market values, weaker reactions to activist 13D filings, and higher compensation levels for both fund managers and directors. This study provides greater clarity on the unresolved impact of takeover defenses on firm value, while showing for the first time that directors, who are responsible for adopting takeover defenses, financially benefit from their use.