In this paper we show in a thought experiment that in an economy where i) investors hold rational expectations, ii) output is generated by a linear homogeneous production function, and iii) real investment is allocated across sectors according to the CAPM, a fractional reserve banking system is not Pareto efficient and amplifies the business cycle. In developing these results we show that these three well known propositions in economics also imply a new view of the business cycle, one where the business cycle is described in terms of the dispersion of an ex-ante probability distribution. The policy implication of this analysis is that bank regulation should go further than the Volcker rule or the Vickers commission proposal by restricting bank investments to currency and deposit accounts on the central bank. Nonbank financial institutions should then carry out the financial intermediation function now carried out by banks. The paper proposes that post office banking perhaps augmented with blockchain technology sometime in the future is one way to implement the transition from fractional reserve banking to full reserve banking. While little academic work has been done on full reserve banking in the aftermath of the Great Crisis, it is interesting to note that it is part of banking reform proposals now (July 2016) before the parliament in Iceland and a special national referendum in Switzerland.

This essay reviews new histories of the role of game theory and rational decision making in shaping the social sciences, economics among them, in the postwar period. The recent books The World the Game Theorists Made by Paul Erickson and How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality by Paul Erickson, Judy Klein, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, Thomas Sturm, and Michael Gordin raise a number of complex historical questions about the interconnections among game theory, utility theory, decision theory, optimization theory, information theory, and theories of rational choice. Moreover, the contingencies of time, place, and person call into question the usefulness of economists' linear narratives about the autonomous and progressive development of modern economics. The essay finally reflects on the challenges that these issues present for historians of recent economics. (JEL B23, C70, D74, N42)

Abstract Hedge funds are heavily involved in corporate restructurings. What makes their involvement distinct from other investors is that hedge funds can trade across the securities of a firm, holding either long or short positions in each security. We analyze the choice of a restructuring proposal by a firm’s manager in the presence of a hedge fund as a potential investor in the firm. We show that, under certain market conditions, there is an equilibrium where the firm’s manager makes a proposal for which a hedge fund finds it profitable to short-sell the equity of the firm, buy the debt of the firm, and via its debtholdings lead the firm to a value-reducing outcome to gain on its short equity position. The necessary and sufficient market conditions under which the aforementioned equilibrium occurs are that the debt and equity markets are segregated and that other traders in the equity market are net buyers on average.

Excessive (substantially above peer) litigation against a bank is indicative of operational risk because it often suggests failure to maintain a strong system of internal control. We examine the relation between bank performance and weak internal control using legal expense as a proxy. We find that legal expense is a strong determinant of loan losses and stock returns. Bank regulators should require reporting of legal expense on call reports to help identify institutions with weaknesses in internal control. Current reporting creates unnecessary information asymmetries because investors are not well informed about operational risk, leading to mispricing of bank securities.

This paper discusses evidence that large, diversified banks lend using `hard' information measures, such as audited financial statements. Structural changes toward larger and more diversified banks may have left some segments of credit markets - those depending on investment in `soft' information - under-served. These trends accelerated following the Financial Crisis. At the same time, bank lending to small businesses, which typically can only supply soft information, has been slow to recover from the Crisis. These trends are worrying because entry of focused banks, the normal market mechanism to counteract such a trend, has been absent since the Crisis.

Extant literature shows that IPO first-day returns are correlated with market returns preceding the issue. We propose a rational explanation for this puzzling predictability by adding a public signal to Benveniste and Spindt (1989)’s information-based framework. A novel result of our model is that the compensation required by investors to truthfully reveal their information decreases with the public signal. This “incentive effect” receives strong empirical support in a sample of 6300 IPOs in 1983–2012. Controlling for the incentive effect, the positive relation between initial returns and pre-issue market returns disappears for top-tier underwriters, where the order book is held to be most informative, effectively resolving the predictability puzzle.

In line with the psychological theory of place attachments, managers favor hometown workers over others. Consistent with this prediction, I find that following periods of industry distress, establishments located near CEOs’ childhood homes experience fewer employment and pay reductions and are less likely to be divested relative to other firm establishments. While it is not possible to directly test whether this employment bias destroys firm value, managers only implement these policies when governance is weak, suggesting that this favoritism is suboptimal. Together, these results provide direct evidence of employee favoritism and show that idiosyncratic manager styles impact corporate employment decisions. Received December 23, 2013; editorial decision January 3, 2017 by Editor Alexander Ljungqvist.

In line with the psychological theory of place attachments, managers favor hometown workers over others. Consistent with this prediction, I find that following periods of industry distress, establishments located near CEOs’childhood homes experience fewer employment and pay reductions and are less likely to be divested relative to other firm establishments. While it is not possible to directly test whether this employment bias destroys firm value, managers only implement these policies when governance is weak, suggesting that this favoritism is suboptimal. Together, these results provide direct evidence of employee favoritism and show that idiosyncratic manager styles impact corporate employment decisions.

Abstract Recent years have seen increased demand from institutional investors for passive replication products that track the performance of hedge fund strategies using liquid investable assets such as futures contracts. In practice, linear replication methods suffer from poor tracking performance and high turnover. We propose a model combination approach to index replication that pools information from a diverse set of pre-specified factor models. Compared with existing methods, the pooled clone strategies yield consistently lower tracking errors, generate less severe portfolio drawdowns, and require substantially smaller trading volume. The pooled hedge fund clones also provide economic benefits in a portfolio allocation context.