ABSTRACT The objective evaluation of evidence is imperative for audit effectiveness and the proper exercise of professional skepticism. However, numerous studies suggest that auditors fail to evaluate evidence objectively when assessing or addressing the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. We develop theory to predict that auditors do evaluate evidence objectively but only when they have stronger wise‐thinking dispositions (WTDs), a construct that is new to the audit literature. We define WTDs as the tendency of individuals to naturally engage in the balanced revision of beliefs and doubts about target phenomena by thinking openly and reflectively about evidence. We report prediction‐consistent results from two experiments that measure the strength of participants' WTDs and manipulate whether the underlying evidence is less or more indicative of fraud. The experimental results also document that auditors vary considerably in WTD strength and collectively demonstrate the reproducibility of audit judgment‐quality benefits of stronger WTDs. We further validate the WTD construct in auditing using confirmatory bi‐factor analyses to show that it has one higher‐order general factor along with several subfactors. Overall, our theory and results advance the literature by identifying WTDs as a determinant of auditors' ability to objectively evaluate evidence. In addition, our findings have implications for standard setters and audit firms as quality control standards and audit working paper review processes might benefit from revisions that take into account that auditors do not objectively evaluate evidence unless they have stronger WTDs.

Abstract We introduce an arbitrage-free term structure model of nominal and real yields that accounts for liquidity risk in Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS). The novel feature of our model is to identify liquidity risk from individual TIPS prices by accounting for the tendency that TIPS, like most fixed-income securities, go into buy-and-hold investors’ portfolios as time passes. We find a sizable and countercyclical TIPS liquidity premium, which helps our model to match TIPS prices. Accounting for liquidity risk also improves the model’s ability to forecast inflation and match surveys of inflation expectations.

Abstract Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private information) and the cost of ameliorating the problem (e.g., costs associated with disclosure). Traditionally these forces are modelled independently. In this paper, we use a simple model to motivate empirical predictions in a setting where these forces are jointly determined––where greater adverse selection entails greater costs of disclosure. We show that joint determination of these forces generates a pronounced non-linearity in the probability of voluntary disclosure. We find that this non-linearity is empirically descriptive of multiple measures of voluntary disclosure in two distinct empirical settings that are commonly thought to feature both private information and proprietary costs: capital investments and sales to major customers.

ABSTRACT We use a novel data set to examine the across‐time consistency and across‐firm comparability of firms' non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Given widespread concern about non‐GAAP reporting among regulators, standard setters, the investor community, and academics, our investigation provides timely evidence on how managers' deviations from their own non‐GAAP disclosure history, or the reporting of industry peers, affects how well earnings inform on firm performance. We begin by identifying firms that change their non‐GAAP earnings definition from one year to the next. These deviations are uncommon, but when managers change the items they exclude in calculating non‐GAAP earnings, the changes generally enhance the information in earnings about firms' core performance. We also examine whether non‐GAAP earnings are more comparable than GAAP earnings and find that firms' non‐GAAP adjustments result in greater earnings comparability. Finally, we examine instances in which firms deviate from common sector‐wide definitions of non‐GAAP earnings. We find that these deviations also result in earnings metrics that better represent firms' core operations. Overall, our results suggest that when managers vary their non‐GAAP calculations, either across time or across firms, the resulting non‐GAAP metrics generally enhance the information in earnings about firms' ongoing performance. Thus, our analysis helps mitigate concerns about why managers might vary their non‐GAAP reporting calculations.

Abstract Researchers disagree about the impact of board independence on firm value. The disagreement generally stems from the endogenous nature of board appointments. I add new evidence to this discussion by using a sample of closed-end funds to document the value-enhancing effects of independent boards. Using cross-sectional, difference-in-differences, and instrumental variables techniques, I address these endogeneity concerns and find consistent evidence that board independence is associated with higher firm value.

We discuss “Economic Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Reporting to Bank Regulators” by Balakrishnan, De George, Ertan, and Scobie (BDES, in this issue). BDES concludes that a key benefit of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators is reduced bank risk, and its costs include reduced profitability from less overall and less risky lending, and higher audit costs. BDES also provides evidence on the channels through which mandatory auditor reporting links to reduced bank risk. We scrutinize BDES's analyses and inferences and suggest additional analyses to improve and deepen them. Most notably, we caution that effective bank regulation entails reducing risk for riskier banks; risk reduction for safer banks suggests regulatory overreach. Our evidence is more indicative of regulatory overreach. Thus, although BDES is an important step forward in understanding the role auditors can and do play in improving information available to key decision-makers other than through auditor reports on financial statements and internal controls, a comprehensive assessment of whether the benefits of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators exceed its costs is left for future research. Such an assessment is necessary before concluding whether mandatory auditor reporting leads to more effective bank regulation or regulatory overreach.

We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common‐value auctions. There are k s identical objects on sale through a uniform‐price auction in market s and there are an additional k r objects on auction in market r , which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object‐to‐bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object‐to‐bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.

This paper examines how the ex ante level of public scrutiny influences a manager's subsequent decision to misreport. The conventional wisdom is that high levels of public scrutiny facilitate monitoring, suggesting a negative relation between scrutiny and misreporting. However, public scrutiny also increases the weight that investors place on earnings in valuing the firm. This in turn increases the benefit of misreporting, suggesting a positive relation. We formalize these two countervailing forces–“monitoring” and “valuation”–in the context of a parsimonious model of misreporting. We show that the combination of these two forces leads to a unimodal relation. Specifically, as the level of public scrutiny increases, misreporting first increases, reaches a peak, and then decreases. We find evidence of such a relation across multiple empirical measures of misreporting, multiple measures of public scrutiny, and multiple research designs.

ABSTRACT Despite issuing extensive guidance related to the evaluation of accounting estimates, the PCAOB continues to identify deficiencies related to the audit of estimates through their inspections process. We examine whether PCAOB inspections lead to more accurate audited accounting estimates, defined as those that more closely match economic reality, by examining a significant estimate within the banking industry. We find that in contrast with the PCAOB's goal of more accurate and unbiased estimates, allowance for loan losses (ALL) estimates become less accurate and more conservative with higher levels of ALL‐related inspection findings for public company audits. We find no evidence of auditor response to PCAOB inspection findings for private‐company audits, which are not subject to PCAOB inspection. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the efficacy of PCAOB inspections in improving estimate accuracy and suggest that firms are managing inspection risk to the potential detriment of audit quality.