I. Overcrowding of the land, 170. — Importance of agricultural problem of eastern Europe. Density of population. Large proportion of rural population; its high density. Low yields. Per capita grain production. II. Consequences as to standard of living and food supply, 174. — Predominantly vegetable diet. Small surplus after supplying wants of producer. Live stock. Prewar grain exports. Reduction of food output during war; continuation of similar causes after war. Widespread food shortage. The Russian famine. III. Prospects for recovery, 180. — Conditions favoring recovery. Importance of political conditions. Increased crops of 1921 except in Russia; exports of food; effect on currency exchange. Probably slower recovery of Russia. IV. Prospect for progress in peasant agriculture, 183. — Vicious circle of overcrowding, poverty, ignorance. Effects of overcrowding on agricultural methods. Shallow plowing. Unsatisfactory crop rotation. Scattered holdings — their explanation and consequences. Mir system. Beneficial effects of democracy. Rapid progress improbable. V. The large estates, 190. — Large-scale operation. Superior efficiency. Polish estates. Agrarian reform — division of estates. Direct gain to peasant overestimated. Measures already taken. Ultimate effects, especially on peasant psychology.

I. Introductory. Definitions of trust, pool, industrial combination, 382. — Theory that elimination of unfair competition and special privileges would rob combinations of monopoly power, 383. — Difficulty of proof or disproof from experience, 385. — Power of pools to advance prices, 389. — Trust prices, 390. — Oil, sugar, tobacco and steel trusts, 391. — Unfair competitive methods and special privileges not sufficient explanation of monopoly power, 393. — The power of combinations as such to maintain monopoly prices, 395. — Theoretical reasoning on the probable influence of combination and the impossibility of competition, 396. — Consequent necessity of regulation or prohibition, 400. II. Possibility of preventing combination, 402. — Success of certain Federal cases against combinations, 402. — Deterrent effect of more severe penalties, 404. — Reasons for failure of certain trust dissolutions to restore competition, 405. — Possibility of destroying and preventing formal trusts and pools, 408. — Weakness of informal understandings, 410.

Introduction. Attitude of the parties in Congress; general character of the legislation, 72. — I. Unfair competitive methods, 74. — General declaration of illegality, 74. — Method of enforcement; discretion of trade commission, 75. — Price discrimination, 77. — Sales and leases conditioned on exclusive patronage, 80. — II. New provisions as to combinations in restraint of trade, 81. — Adequacy of the Sherman act without amendment, 82. — Intercorporate stockholdings, 82. — Interlocking directorates, 84. — Inadequacy of prohibition when community of stock interest is permitted, 85. — Provisions as to banks, 86. — Personal liability to penalties under anti-trust laws, 87. — Private suits, 88. — III. Mismanagement of railroads. Relations to banking, supply and construction companies. Misappropriation of funds, 89. — IV. The interstate trade commission, 90. — Powers of investigation; reports from corporations, 91. — Powers in enforcement and interpretation of law, 94. — Assistance of the commission to attorney general and courts; recommendations for future legislation, 95. — Beneficial results to be anticipated, 97.

III. Difficulty of limiting the number and scope of trusts under a policy of regulation, 665. — Regulation implies fixing of prices or profits, or both, 668. — Difficulties of cost accounting, 670; of fluctuations in demand, 671. — Railroad regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission proves nothing for trust regulation, 672. — The policy a stepping stone to socialism, 675. IV. The alleged advantages of combinations, 677. — Desire to secure monopoly and promoter's profits in fact the cause of combinations, 678. — A monopolistic combination not necessarily more efficient than a limited one, 679. — Inductive evidence inconclusive, 680.General reasoning, on advantages from magnitude of operations, 685; from combination as such, 686; from elimination of competition, 689. — Monopoly tends to stagnation, 695. — Summary of conclusions, 696.

Journal Article The United States Industrial Commission; Methods of Government Investigation Get access E. Dana Durand E. Dana Durand Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 16, Issue 4, August 1902, Pages 564–586, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882174 Published: 01 August 1902

The British Trade-Union Congress of 1902 E. Dana Durand E. Dana Durand Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 17, Issue 1, November 1902, Pages 181–184, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884715 Published: 01 November 1902

Journal Article Ross's Russian Soviet Republic1 E. Dana Durand E. Dana Durand Washington, D. C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 38, Issue 2, February 1924, Pages 330–338, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884015 Published: 01 February 1924