Despite the extensive literature on prediction of banking crises by Early Warning Systems (EWSs), their practical use by policy makers is limited, even in the international financial institutions. This is a paradox since the changing nature of banking risks as more economies liberalise and develop their financial systems, as well as ongoing innovation, makes the use of EWS for informing policies aimed at preventing crises more necessary than ever. In this context, we assess the logit and signal extraction EWS for banking crises on a comprehensive common dataset. We suggest that logit is the most appropriate approach for global EWS and signal extraction for country-specific EWS. Furthermore, it is important to consider the policy maker's objectives when designing predictive models and setting related thresholds since there is a sharp trade-off between correctly calling crises and false alarms.

Drawing on a unique dataset of flow-of funds and balance sheet data, this paper analyzes the impact of financial crises on aggregate corporate financing and expenditure in a range of countries. Investment and inventory contractions are the main contributors to lower GDP growth after crises, with a much greater effect in emerging market countries. The debt–equity ratio is correlated with investment and inventory declines following crises. Econometric analysis suggests that financial crises have a greater impact on expenditure and the financing of corporate sectors in emerging markets than in industrial countries. Industrial countries appear to benefit from a pick-up in bond issuance in the wake of banking crises. Although companies in emerging market countries hold more precautionary liquidity, this is evidently not sufficient to prevent a greater amplitude of response of expenditure to shocks.

Whereas macroprudential policy has come to the fore since the Global Financial Crisis, with many regulators being given responsibility for such policy, the appropriate tools and the effectiveness of such tools remain open questions. We suggest that existing work on effectiveness of macroprudential policy may be vulnerable to bias due to omission of long run cointegration effects. This paper seeks to offer a fresh baseline for work in this area by adopting a cointegration framework which is robust to a variety of alternative techniques and compares favourably with non-cointegrated alternatives. We assess the impact of typical macroprudential policy interventions on house price and household credit growth in up to 19 OECD countries, using three datasets from the IMF and BIS, thus giving both a wider range of control variables and broader coverage of instruments than in most extant work. We find evidence that macroprudential polices remain effective in both short- and long-run at curbing house price and household credit growth even within a cointegration framework, albeit some tools are more effective than others. These include, in particular, taxes on financial institutions, general capital requirements, strict loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income ratio limits.

In order to assess the effect of EMU on market conditions for banks based in countries which adopt the Single Currency, we use the H indicator suggested by Panzar and Rosse (Panzar, J.C., Rosse, J.N., 1987. Journal of Industrial Economics 35, 443–456). Our contribution is to assess results separately for large and small banks, and for interest income and total income as a dependent variable. From a panel of banks over the period 1992–1996, we provide evidence that the behavior of large banks was not fully competitive as compared to the US. Regarding small banks, the level of competition appears to be even lower, especially in France and Germany.

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.

Against the background of the acknowledged importance of off-balance-sheet exposures in the sub prime crisis, we seek to investigate whether this was a new phenomenon or common to earlier crises. Using a logit approach to predicting banking crises in 14 OECD countries we find a significant impact of a proxy for the ratio of banks’ off-balance-sheet activity to total (off and on balance sheet) activity, as well as capital and liquidity ratios, the current account balance and GDP growth. These results are robust to the exclusion of the most crisis prone countries in our model. For early warning purposes we show that real house price growth is a good proxy for off balance sheet activity prior to the sub-prime episode. Variables capturing off-balance sheet activity have been neglected in most early warning models to date. We consider it essential that regulators take into account the results for crisis prediction in regulating banks and their off-balance sheet exposures, and thus controlling their contribution to systemic risk.

Early warning systems (EWS) for banking crises generally omit bank capital, bank liquidity and property prices. Most work on EWS has been for global samples dominated by emerging market crises where time series data on bank capital adequacy and property prices are typically absent. We estimate logit crisis models for OECD countries, finding strong effects from capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as well as property prices, and can exclude traditional variables. Higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios have a marked effect on the crisis probabilities, implying long-run benefits to offset some of the costs that such regulations may impose.