This study develops and tests the hypothesis that the quality and quantity of municipal financial information are positively associated with increased competition in the primary market for new issues of general obligation bonds. A measure of market competition, the number of underwriter bids tendered, is regressed on several market‐related and issue‐specific control variables and a group of financial reporting test variables. A sample of 224 new issues of municipal general obligation bonds sold by competitive bid between 1978 and 1983 is examined. The results generally support the hypothesis. Employment of an independent CPA firm auditor and more extensive disclosure increase competition, as expected. However, no support was found for the argument that holding a Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance increases the level of underwriter competition. Résumé. Les auteurs établissent et vérifient l'hypothèse selon laquelle la qualité et la quantité d'information financière municipale sont en relation positive avec l'augmentation de la concurrence sur le marché primaire pour les nouvelles émissions d'obligations générales. Une mesure de la concurrence sur le marché, soit le nombre d'offres de preneurs ferme, est soumise à une analyse de régression basée sur plusieurs variables de contrôle reliées au marché et particulières à l'émission et sur un groupe de variables‐tests reliées à l'information financière. Les auteurs examinent un échantillon de 224 nouvelles émissions d'obligations municipales générales vendues par soumission concurrentielle entre 1978 et 1983. Les résultats obtenus corroborent de façon générale l'hypothèse posée. Le recours à un vérificateur d'un cabinet de CPA indépendant et la publication d'informations plus étendues accentuent la concurrence, comme prévu. Cependant, rien ne confirme l'hypothèse selon laquelle la détention d'un Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance intensifie le degré de concurrence chez les preneurs ferme.

Disclosures, Municipal bonds, Net interest cost, Auditing

[Government auditing standards place strong emphasis on strengthening internal controls and ensuring compliance with laws and regulations.1 A high quality audit can provide assurance to the municipal bond market that the local government's internal controls and legal compliance are adequate to minimize opportunities for waste and fraud and to assure the continued inflow of federal financial assistance. Simunic and Stein (1987) suggest that in the capital markets, auditor reputation is made credible by the potential loss of quasi-rents on fixed investments from the failure to deliver the implied audit quality and the subsequent revelation of such failure. Although auditor moral hazard has received some attention in the academic literature, it is perceived to be particularly acute in the government environment. In this environment, the chances of client financial failure and consequent ex post revelation of lower-than-implied audit quality are minimal. Thus, there is a need for alternative mechanisms for enhancing the credibility of the audit. Both the General Accounting Office (GAO 1987) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 1987) view appropriate audit procurement practices as a mechanism for ensuring that the contracted audit quality is in fact delivered. To the extent that management quality is multidimensional, appropriate audit procurement could be viewed as one dimension of the overall quality of administration, or perhaps as part of a larger managerial control dimension. Nonetheless, the GAO and the AICPA suggest that appropriate procurement practices can independently contribute to the selection of a competent auditor in a market in which it is difficult to directly assess whether an auditor possesses the specialized knowledge necessary to provide a high quality government audit. The bond market remains the primary source of (financial) market discipline at the municipal level. In this market, default risk is priced using yield-to-maturity which is a continuous variable. Thus, cities do not have to actually fail for bondholders to suffer capital losses. While information about audit quality may be conveyed by other means (e.g., by size of audit firm), the procurement practices recommended by the GAO (1987) offer the opportunity for additional discrimination in the municipal bond market. Prior research suggests that two discrete levels of implied audit quality (Big Eight/non-Big Eight) are available in the market for audit services.2 However, given the greater risk of auditor moral hazard in the government environment, the traditional Big Eight/non-Big Eight dichotomy is not considered sufficient for differentiating the quality of government audits. The highly specialized knowledge and skills required for government audits results in wide variation in auditor qualifications from firm to firm, and even from office to office within a Big Eight firm. Moreover, the risk of obtaining a low quality audit is relatively high because such audits traditionally have not been easily detected, and only recently have auditors faced significant business risk from providing low quality government audits. Both the GAO and the AICPA have stressed the role of appropriate procurement practices (client monitoring) in mitigating the widespread problem of substandard government audits by CPAs. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the hypothesis that client monitoring is priced in the seasoned municipal bond market above and beyond other independent measures of local administration quality and the Big Eight/non-Big Eight dichotomy. Our empirical results are generally consistent with the hypothesis, even though the results for a subsample of cities with a Big Eight auditor are also consistent with the auditor competition hypothesis tested by O'Keefe and Westort (1992) and Copley and Doucet (1993).]

Discusses governmental audit procurement practices and seasoned bond prices. Role of credible auditor reputation on capital markets; Insight into multidimensional quality management; Bond markets as sources of market discipline; Levels of implied audit quality; Factors affecting the variation of auditor qualifications.

[This study provides evidence that market segmentation affects the strength of the association between financial disclosure and net interest cost for new issues of municipal bonds. Previous studies (see, e.g., Amershi and Ramamurtie 1990; Cook 1982; Hendershott and Kidwell 1978; Kidwell et al. 1983) show that the geographic segmentation of primary markets for municipal bonds along regional and national lines is characterized by different sources and costs of information. Because little information is available from alternative sources for the less marketable bonds of smaller issuers which use regional markets, financial reporting variables are hypothesized to be associated more strongly with interest costs for these issues than for those of larger municipalities, whose bonds are typically issued in the national bond market. Cook (1982) argues that the costs of obtaining information about small issuers from alternative sources are relatively high. For these issuers, who also do not issue bonds frequently, regional underwriters may be the only informational intermediaries (other than rating agencies if the bonds are rated) between the issuers and investors (Kidwell et al. 1983). Thus, financial and other entity-specific information contained in the offering statement are expected to be weighted more heavily in pricing these bonds than for bonds of larger issuers. Although this differential-information hypothesis is analogous to Atiase's (1985) argument regarding differential predisclosure of information, our study assumes differential availability of information across market segments, and size alone is not likely to be an adequate proxy for segmentation. Our main analysis uses the nature of the underwriting syndicate, whether it is managed by a national or regional underwriter, to proxy for the relevant market segment. Previous studies of municipal accounting (see, e.g., Ingram and Copeland 1982; Wallace 1981; Wilson and Howard 1984) have provided evidence of an association between bond measures and accounting and auditing variables. However, the results were mixed and inconsistent, which may be attributable to differences in the entities examined (cities, counties, and school districts), the time periods examined, or definitions of variables. Also, differences in the mix of bonds issued in each segment may have contributed to the inconsistent results. By examining the relationship between accounting and auditing variables and bond interest costs separately for each segment of the primary bond market, our study provides useful evidence on the potential effect of different information environments on this relationship. Regression results based on a sample of 119 new municipal bond issues, partitioned on a measure of segmentation (regional vs. national underwriter), are consistent with the hypothesis that the association between the quality and quantity of financial disclosure and interest costs is stronger for municipalities that issue bonds in local or regional markets than for those that issue bonds in the national market. Our results suggest that future research in this area should consider the potential effects of market segmentation when testing the association between accounting or auditing variables and bond interest costs.]

[This study tests whether there is a positive association between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a quality-differentiated audit. Audit firm quality is represented in two ways: a continuous size model in which a direct association is posited between auditor size (measured by clients' sales) and audit quality, and a "brand name" model in which the Big Eight group of auditors is defined as higher quality suppliers. The tests are supportive of the brand name model of audit quality: agency cost proxies are significant as a group, after controlling for client size and growth, only in the brand name model. The results are also supportive (albeit weakly in some instances) of the following individual agency-related incentives for higher quality audits: monitoring of incentive performance contracts, diffusion of ownership, owner-debtholder conflict, and the subsequent issue of public securities after the auditor change. However, the explanatory power of the models tested is low, after controlling for client size and growth.]

Considerable evidence exists that governmental accounting numbers are related empirically to bond risk and return measures. However, prior research does not preclude the possibility that accounting numbers merely reflect unobserved factors such as economic and political attributes impounded in bond measures. This study considers whether governmental annual financial reports convey new information directly to the bond market. Changes in bond prices during the period around the release date of governmental annual reports were examined to assess market responses to the reports. No significant evidence was obtained to suggest that municipal bond investors use the information in the annual report at the time of its release to adjust bond prices. In contrast, new bond issues and bond rating announcements were associated with significant market reactions. Thus, these results indicate that, while issuer-specific accounting information may be used by bond investors in conjunction with decisions involving new issues and rating evaluations, investors do not appear to impound the information directly into secondary market prices at the time the information is released.

[Considerable evidence exists that governmental accounting numbers are related empirically to bond risk and return measures. However, prior research does not preclude the possibility that accounting numbers merely reflect unobserved factors such as economic and political attributes impounded in bond measures. This study considers whether governmental annual financial reports convey new information directly to the bond market. Changes in bond prices during the period around the release date of governmental annual reports were examined to assess market responses to the reports. No significant evidence was obtained to suggest that municipal bond investors use the information in the annual report at the time of its release to adjust bond prices. In contrast, new bond issues and bond rating announcements were associated with significant market reactions. Thus, these results indicate that, while issuer-specific accounting information may be used by bond investors in conjunction with decisions involving new issues and rating evaluations, investors do not appear to impound the information directly into secondary market prices at the time the information is released.]

This study provides evidence that market segmentation affects the strength of the association between financial disclosure and net interest cost for new issues of municipal bonds. Previous studies (see, e.g., Amershi and Ramamurtie 1990; Cook 1982; Hendershott and Kidwell 1978; Kidwell et al. 1983) show that the geographic segmentation of primary markets for municipal bonds along regional and national lines is characterized by different sources and costs of information. Because little information is available from alternative sources for the less marketable bonds of smaller issuers which use regional markets, financial reporting variables are hypothesized to be associated more strongly with interest costs for these issues than for those of larger municipalities, whose bonds are typically issued in the national bond market. Cook (1982) argues that the costs of obtaining information about small issuers from alternative sources are relatively high. For these issuers, who also do not issue bonds frequently, regional underwriters may be the only informational intermediaries (other than rating agencies if the bonds are rated) between the issuers and investors (Kidwell et al. 1983). Thus, financial and other entity-specific information contained in the offering statement are expected to be weighted more heavily in pricing these bonds than for bonds of larger issuers. Although this differential-information hypothesis is analogous to Atiase's (1985) argument regarding differential predisclosure of information, our study assumes differential availability of information across market segments, and size alone is not likely to be an adequate proxy for segmentation. Our main analysis uses the nature of the underwriting syndicate, whether it is managed by a national or regional underwriter, to proxy for the relevant market segment. Previous studies of municipal accounting (see, e.g., Ingram and Cope- land 1982; Wallace 1981; Wilson and Howard 1984) have provided evidence of an association between bond measures and accounting and auditing variables. However, the results were mixed and inconsistent, which may be attributable to differences in the entities examined (cities, counties, and school districts), the time periods examined, or definitions of variables. Also, differences in the mix of bonds issued in each segment may have contributed to the inconsistent results. By examining the relationship between accounting and auditing variables and bond interest costs separately for each segment of the primary bond market, our study provides useful evidence on the potential effect of different information environments on this relationship. Regression results based on a sample of 119 new municipal bond issues, partitioned on a measure of segmentation (regional vs. national underwriter), are consistent, with the hypothesis that the association between the quality and quantity of financial disclosure and interest costs is stronger for municipalities that issue bonds in local or regional markets than for those that issue bonds in the national market. Our results suggest that future research in this area should consider the potential effects of market segmentation when testing the association between accounting or auditing variables and bond interest costs.

This study tests whether them is a positive association between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a quality-differentiated audit. Audit firm quality is represented in two ways: a continuous size model in which a direct association is posited between auditor size (measured by clients' sales) and audit quality, and a "brand name" model in which the Big Eight group of auditors is defined as higher quality suppliers. The tests are supportive of the brand name model of audit quality: agency cost proxies are significant as a group, after controlling for client size and growth, only in the brand name model. The results are also supportive (albeit weakly In some Instances) of the following individual agency-related Incentives for higher quality audits: monitoring of Incentive performance contracts, diffusion of ownership, owner-debtholder conflict, and the subsequent Issue of public securities after the auditor change. However, the explanatory power of the models tested is low, after controlling for client size and growth.