In cooperative property rights systems, workers jointly own and manage production, whereas in outside-ownership systems, an owner contracts workers. Despite a rich literature on how the allocation of property rights matters for specialization, efficiency, and equity, little causal evidence exists. During a land reform in El Salvador in 1980, the military government reorganized properties owned by individuals with cumulative landholdings over 500 hectares into cooperatives; properties below this threshold remained as outside-owned properties. Using the discontinuous probability of cooperative formation, I provide evidence on the effects of cooperative property rights relative to outside ownership on specialization, productivity, and worker equity.

All colonial powers granted concessions to private companies to extract natural resources during the colonial era. In Africa, these concessions were characterized by indirect rule and violence. We use the arbitrarily defined borders of rubber concessions granted in the north of the Congo Free State to examine the causal effects of this form of economic organization on development. We find that historical exposure to the concessions causes significantly worse education, wealth, and health outcomes. To examine mechanisms, we collect survey and experimental data from individuals near a former concession boundary. We find that village chiefs inside the former concessions provide fewer public goods, are less likely to be elected, and are more likely to be hereditary. However, individuals in the concessions are more trusting, more cohesive, and more supportive of sharing income. We interpret our results as reflecting how institutions and culture may act as substitutes in the context of the widespread colonial concession system.

Does variation in how religious festivals are celebrated have economic consequences? We study the economic impacts of the timing of Catholic patron saint day festivals in Mexico. For causal identification, we exploit cross-locality variation in festival dates and in the timing of agricultural seasons. We estimate the impact of "agriculturally-coinciding" festivals (those coinciding with peak planting or harvest months) on long-run economic development of localities. Agriculturally-coinciding festivals lead to lower household income and worse development outcomes overall. These negative effects are likely due to lower agricultural productivity, which inhibits structural transformation out of agriculture. Agriculturally-coinciding festivals may nonetheless persist because they also lead to higher religiosity and social capital.

Between 1921 and 1956, French colonial governments organized medical campaigns to treat and prevent sleeping sickness. Villagers were forcibly examined and injected with medications with severe, sometimes fatal, side effects. We digitized 30 years of archival records to document the locations of campaign visits at a granular geographic level for five central African countries. We find that greater campaign exposure reduces vaccination rates and trust in medicine, as measured by willingness to consent to a blood test. We examine relevance for present-day health initiatives; World Bank projects in the health sector are less successful in areas with greater exposure.

How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 non-aggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees, leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organisations.