Les auteurs se demandent si le fait pour les directions d’entreprises de présenter des éléments exceptionnels dans les états financiers reflète la performance économique ou révèle l’opportunisme. Ils comparent plus précisément les éléments exceptionnels présentés sous la forme d’un poste distinct de l’état des résultats (présentation en résultats) à ceux qui sont intégrés à un autre poste et présentés uniquement dans les notes complémentaires (présentation par voie de notes). L’étude est motivée par l’intérêt des normalisateurs pour l’information relative à la performance et la présentation des états financiers, ainsi que par les études antérieures relatives aux choix du mode de présentation par les directions d’entreprises, dans d’autres contextes. Les résultats empiriques révèlent que les éléments exceptionnels qui sont présentés en résultats sont moins persistants que ceux qui sont présentés par voie de notes. Ces observations demeurent les mêmes, peu importe les différentes spécifications adoptées. Dans l’ensemble, les constatations des auteurs confirment que les directions d’entreprises qui préfèrent la présentation en résultats à la présentation par voie de notes ont pour but d’aider les utilisateurs à repérer les éléments exceptionnels les plus susceptibles d’être différents des autres éléments des résultats, c’est‐à‐dire que leurs motifs sont plus informationnels qu’opportunistes.

This paper investigates whether managers’ presentation of special items within the financial statements reflects economic performance or opportunism. Specifically, we assess special items presented as a separate line item on the income statement (income statement presentation) to those aggregated within another line item with disclosure only in the footnotes (footnote presentation). Our study is motivated by standard‐setting interest in performance reporting and financial statement presentation, as well as prior research investigating managers’ presentation choices in other contexts. Empirical results reveal that special items receiving income statement presentation are less persistent relative to those receiving footnote presentation. These results are consistent across numerous alternative specifications. Overall, the findings are consistent with managers using the income statement versus footnote presentation to assist users in identifying those special items most likely to differ from other components of earnings — that is, for informational, as opposed to opportunistic, motivations.

This paper investigates whether presentation of special items within the financial statements reflects the firm's underlying economic performance or opportunism. We examine the presentation of recognized special items either as a separate line item on the income statement or aggregated within another line item with disclosure only in the footnotes. Our study is motivated by standard-setting interest in performance reporting and financial statement presentation, as well as prior research investigating managers' presentation choices in other contexts. Using different constructs of persistence to capture the economics of reported special items, we find evidence consistent across a range of specifications that special items highlighted on the income statement are more transitory than those revealed only in the footnotes. For most special items, these results are consistent with this presentation decision reflecting underlying firm performance. For a subset observations -namely, those likely to reflect "big bath" reporting incentives -we provide limited evidence suggestive of opportunism in this presentation decision.

This study examines European stock market reactions to 16 events associated with the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe. European IFRS adoption represented a major milestone toward financial reporting convergence yet spurred controversy reaching the highest levels of government. We find an incrementally positive reaction for firms with lower quality pre-adoption information, which is more pronounced for banks, and with higher pre-adoption information asymmetry, consistent with investors expecting net information quality benefits from IFRS adoption. We find an incrementally negative reaction for firms domiciled in code law countries, consistent with investors' concerns over enforcement of IFRS in those countries. Finally, we find a positive reaction to IFRS adoption events for firms with high-quality pre-adoption information, consistent with investors expecting net convergence benefits from IFRS adoption.