The paper presents a method for calculating the cost of equity capital for the non-marketable securities of private firms and its difference from the cost of equity capital of an all else equal public firm (the private firm premium). The method is based on a theoretical framework that assumes the investor is undiversified due to her holdings in non-marketable securities. We implement the method for both unlevered and levered firms, and also consider the effect of taxes. The findings indicate that the private firm premium increases with the firm's asset risk, its leverage ratio, and the non-diversification of the private firm's owner, while taxes are negatively related to the private firm premium.

This paper investigates the stock market reaction to a change in investor mood following the Eurovision Song Contest—an annual international song competition and one of the most watched non-sporting events globally. Contrary to existing literature on international competitions, we find a positive swing in investor sentiment in the winning country. The elevated atmosphere is reflected in a positive abnormal return of approximately 0.35% on the first trading day after the victory. This finding is robust to various event-study methods and to various benchmarks. This positive return is reversed several days later. Further, we do not find any indication of negative sentiment in other participating countries; specifically, in countries perceived as the losers of the contest. Finally, we do not find any indication that the positive market reaction reflects economic benefits stemming from a victory. Overall, we conjecture that a competition structure is an important determinant of investor sentiment in stock markets.

We find significant positive abnormal returns surrounding a surprising and quick enactment of a law that restricts executive pay to a binding upper limit in a few industries. We find that the effect is concentrated only for firms in which the restriction is binding. We also find that the increase in value is greater for firms with weaker corporate governance and smaller for firms that grant a greater portion of equity-based compensation to their executives. These results provide indications that, on average, compensation contracts can be set in a way that does not maximize firm value.