Auditors commonly rely on reviewing management's estimation process to audit accounting estimates. When control deficiencies bias the estimation process by creating omissions of critical inputs, standards require that auditors replace or supplement review of management's estimation process with tests that can identify the omissions. Importantly, overreliance on reviewing management's estimation process when it has been biased by a control deficiency can result in auditor acceptance of an inappropriate accounting estimate. We use an experiment to examine whether auditors recognize the insufficiency of increased sampling of a biased estimation process and their selection of alternative tests to replace or supplement review of the biased estimation process. We find that a significant minority (33 percent) of Big 4 senior auditors erroneously increase tests of management's biased estimation process. We also find that auditors have difficulty selecting alternative tests to replace or supplement review of management's biased estimation process, frequently choosing tests that are either ineffective or inefficient. Our findings suggest that auditors often reach inappropriate judgments about the capability of audit evidence to address control deficiencies and that nonsampling risk (judgment risk) may be a larger risk than auditors realize.

Divergent views exist about whether boards must tradeoff advising for monitoring performance when utilizing outside versus inside directors. We suggest a dichotomous tradeoff focus underestimates outside directors׳ impact on board performance. We find outside director tenure positively associated with firm acquisition/investment policy advising performance and CEO compensation monitoring performance, suggesting that advising and monitoring do not always compete for directors׳ time. However, tenure is not a panacea – it marginally weakens financial reporting monitoring performance which is instead enhanced by outside directors׳ financial expertise. Overall, the results suggest outside director tenure and diverse expertise support both advising and monitoring performance.

In an internal control audit, the consequences and assessment subjectivity of control problems motivate managers to try to persuade auditors to lower the assessed severity of an observed control deviation. We report an experiment in which 106 audit seniors evaluate either information technology (IT) or manual control deviations that are potentially indicative of significant deficiencies, after exposure to persuasion tactics based in either concession or denial. For IT control deviations, we find that auditors assess the significance of deficiency lower and the perceived adequacy of management's explanation higher for concessions than for denials. For manual control deviations, we find no differences between concessions and denials. Our results provide evidence of a systematic bias in auditor judgment and indicate a rationale for the ubiquity of management persuasion attempts around control deviations—sometimes they work.

Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

The trend toward continuous monitoring of automated business transactions by the internal audit function is growing as organizations seek to improve internal control. In this study, we demonstrate that continuous monitoring and the time horizon over which performance-contingent incentives are based can interact, thereby yielding potential functional and dysfunctional effects on managerial decisions. Seventy-two experienced corporate managers completed a between-participants experiment that randomized monitoring frequency (periodic or continuous) and incentive horizon (short-term or long-term). We found that earnings management of real activities significantly decreased as the frequency of monitoring increased in the presence of a short-term incentive horizon—a functional effect. However, with a long-term incentive horizon, the participants’ willingness to change the current level of investment in a risky but viable project significantly dropped as the frequency of monitoring increased, even though additional investment would enhance the likelihood of the project’s eventual success—a dysfunctional effect. We also observed that more frequent monitoring significantly decreased the willingness of managers to continue with a risky but viable project regardless of incentive horizon and the effect was significantly pronounced in the presence of a short-term, relative to long-term, incentive horizon—another dysfunctional consequence. Implications of the research findings to theory and practice are discussed.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that firms provide MD&A disclosures quantifying the earnings effect of reasonably likely changes in critical accounting estimates (quantitative CAE). This paper examines the determinants and consequences of quantitative CAE. We find that quantitative CAE are negatively associated with management's incentives to misreport (proxied by portfolio vega) and positively associated with audit committee accounting expertise and with audit offices with multiple quantitative CAE clients. These findings hold for the presence, initiation, number, and magnitude of quantitative CAE, and for both pension and non-pension quantitative CAE. We also find that incidences of AAERs, misstatements, and small positive earnings surprises decrease after initiation of quantitative CAE. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the use of quantitative disclosure to inform users about accounting estimation uncertainty in financial reports. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Practice and research recognize the importance of extensive knowledge of accounting and financial reporting experience for generating reliable financial statements. However, we consider the possibility that such knowledge and experience increase the likelihood of material misstatement when executives have incentives to misreport. We use executives' prior experience as an audit manager or partner as a measure of extensive accounting and financial reporting competence. We find that the interaction of this measure and compensation-based incentives increases the likelihood of misstatements. Further, auditors discount the audit fee premium associated with compensation-based incentives when executives have accounting competence. Together, our results suggest that a dark side of accounting competence emerges in the presence of certain incentives, but auditors view accounting competence favorably despite the heightened risk. In further analyses, we demonstrate that executives' aggressive attitude toward reporting exacerbates the effect of accounting competence and compensation-based incentives on misstatements, but not on audit fees. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Audit firms hesitate to take full advantage of data and analytics (D&A) audit approaches because they lack certainty about how external reviewers evaluate those approaches. We propose that external reviewers use an effort heuristic when evaluating audit quality, judging less effortful audit procedures as lower quality, which could shape how external reviewers evaluate D&A audit procedures. We conduct two experiments in which experienced external reviewers evaluate one set of audit procedures (D&A or traditional) within an engagement review, while holding constant the procedures' level of assurance. Our first experiment provides evidence that external reviewers rely on an effort heuristic when evaluating D&A audit procedures—they perceive D&A audit procedures as lower in quality than traditional audit procedures because they perceive them to be less effortful. Our second experiment confirms these results and evaluates a theory‐based intervention that reduces reviewers' reliance on the effort heuristic, causing them to judge quality similarly across D&A and traditional audit procedures.