Does accounting regime play a role in the well-documented phenomenon of overbidding in M&As? The 2001 regulatory change from a goodwill amortization to a non-amortization regime (SFAS 142) affords us a quasi-experimental setting for testing the consequences of M&A accounting rules for acquirers' bidding decisions. Relying on a novel approach to modeling optimal bidding, our primary finding indicates a significant increase in overbidding in the post-2001 period, suggesting that M&A accounting has real consequences for bidding decisions, and that this result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. In addition, supplementary tests show that overbidding is more pronounced in pooling versus purchase transactions, and that the accounting regime's implications for overbidding and acquisition premium are distinct. Overall, our findings shed light on the role accounting plays in shaping managerial decisions—and, ultimately, shareholder wealth—in an important corporate setting. They may thus inform researchers, corporate boards, and standards setters. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We advance a theory asserting that CSR performance may exacerbate, not necessarily moderate, a company's negative stock price response to negative events. In testing this theory, we hypothesize and find that CSR performance alleviates (magnifies) the immediate negative stock price response to inadvertent (fraudulent) restatement announcements, and that these findings are robust to specifications that consider alternative CSR measures and a multitude of control variables shown by prior research to have explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. Overall, using restatement announcements as a channel through which CSR performance may affect company value, we show, in contrast to prior research, that depending on management conduct leading to the restatement, a company's CSR performance may destroy, not necessarily enhance, firm value. Our findings may, thus, inform researchers, market participants, and regulators. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.