This paper highlights the impact of voluntary export restrictions (VERs) on the nonrestricted supplier by investigating the effect of the U.S.-Japan auto VER on the behavior of European producers. Using three independent approaches (supply functions, hedonic regressions, and casual evidence), it shows that European producers raised prices by nearly one third. U.S. welfare loss to Europe ($3.4 billion in 1984) actually exceeded its loss to Japan ($2.4 billion), and the small social loss within the United States. Total annual cost of a job saved in the industry was $181, 000.

The article embeds child labor in a standard general equilibrium, two‐sector model of a small open economy facing perfectly competitive markets, efficiency wages, and free trade. The modern sector uses skilled adult labor and capital, and the agrarian sector uses unskilled (child and adult) labor and skilled adult labor. Trade policies, foreign direct investment, or both that increase the modern‐sector output reduce the incidence of child labor. Emigration of skilled (unskilled) workers reduces (increases) the incidence of child labor. Child‐wage subsidies increase the incidence of child labor, and a ban on child labor benefits unskilled adult workers but hurts skilled workers.

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of R&D-based trade between two structurally identical countries in which both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. Trade liberalization increases R&D investment and the rate of technological change. It also reduces the relative wage of unskilled workers and results in skill upgrading within each industry when R&D is the skilled-labor intensive activity relative to manufacturing of final products. Time-series evidence from the United States and simulation analysis support the empirical relevance of the model, which offers a North–North trade explanation for increasing wage inequality.

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade in which research and development races between firms determine the rate of product innovation in the North. Tariffs designed to protect dying industries in the North from Southern competition reduce the steady-state number of dominant firms in the North, reduce the rate of product innovation, and increase the relative wage of Northern workers.

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade in which research and development races between firms determine the rate of product innovation in the North. Tariffs designed to protect dying industries in the North from Southern competition reduce the steady-state number of dominant firms in the North, reduce the rate of product innovation, and increase the relative wage of Northern workers.