This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that, when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range. Coauthors are Nikolaos T. Milonas, Anthony Saunders, and Nickolaos G. Travlos.

This study examines the impact on equity prices of nine pronouncements related to the proposed accounting for nonpension postretirement benefits. Compared to a control group, the experiment firms exhibit significant negative abnormal returns around the issuance of the Exposure Draft on nonpension postretirement benefits. The negative abnormal returns are most pronounced for firms with few retirees relative to current employees, firms with high debt ratios, small firms, and firms currently reporting these benefits on the pay-as-you-go basis. These results are consistent with the contracting cost hypotheses.

[This paper re-examines Basu's [1978] finding that earnings yields are related to the unexpected earnings-security returns association in a manner consistent with biased investor expectations of earnings. The results indicate that those early findings were due to (1) a classification bias inherent in the market index earnings expectation model used, and (2) failure of the returns conditioning model to incorporate a share price effect on security returns. Both factors in the research design have implications for contemporary studies of the unexpected earnings-security returns association.]

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It is hypothesized that stockholder controlled banks have incentives to take higher risk than managerially controlled banks and that these differences in risk become more pronounced in periods of deregulation. In support of this hypothesis, we show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks during the 1979–1982 period of relative deregulation.

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It is hypothesized that stockholder controlled banks have incentives to take higher risk than managerially controlled banks and that these differences in risk become more pronounced in periods of deregulation. In support of this hypothesis, the authors show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks during the 1979-82 period of relative deregulation.

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It is hypothesized that stockholder controlled banks have incentives to take higher risk than managerially controlled banks and that these differences in risk become more pronounced in periods of deregulation. In support of this hypothesis, we show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks during the 1979–1982 period of relative deregulation.

This paper re-examines Basu's [1978] finding that earnings yields are related to the unexpected earnings-security returns association in a manner consistent with biased Investor expectations of earnings. The results indicate that those early findings were clue to 11) a classification bras inherent in the market index earnings expectation model used, and (2) failure of the returns conditioning model to incorporate a share price effect on security returns. Both factors in the research design have implications for contemporary studies of the unexpected earnings-security returns association.

This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range.